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The conventional wisdom in American politics associates Christian appeals with the Republican 
Party. However, the fact is, many prominent Democratic politicians identify as Christian along 
with many Democratic voters. This paper draws upon extant research in political psychology to 
propose a theory of how Christian appeals from Democratic politicians might positively 
influence liberal voters’ political decision-making. The first section provides a brief overview of 
Christian social activism in the United States in order to establish the compatibility between 
progressivism and Christianity throughout American history. The second section outlines the 
theory that proposes how Democratic politicians could use Christian appeals to craft moral 
narratives in order to catalyze emotional reactions in liberal voters that might positively impact 
their attitudes towards Democratic candidates. Finally, the third section further explicates the 
theory via case studies of Christian appeals in the rhetoric of Barack Obama, John Kerry, and 
Hillary Clinton. The first case study is congruent with the theory, while the second and third case 
studies demonstrate the potential effectiveness of Christian appeals even in the absence of certain 
theoretical elements.  

















A Theory of Democratic Religious Appeals 
     When liberal voters think of Christianity and American politics, some may think of the 
Christian right’s support for Republican causes. Liberals might recall September 11, 2001, when 
televangelist Jerry Falwell Sr. blamed the fall of the twin towers on “abortionists…pagans, 
feminists, and the gays and lesbians [and] the ACLU” (FitzGerald 2017: 466). Perhaps they 
remember the 2004 presidential election, when Archbishop Charles Chaput suggested that 
anyone who voted for John Kerry had committed a sin and was not fit to receive communion 
(Kirkpatrick and Goodstein 2004). Conversely, some liberals might think about Christianity in 
America in terms of many Republicans politicians’ habitual public invocations of their Christian 
faith. For instance, during the presidential primary in 2015, Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) told an 
audience in Iowa that conservatives should “get down on their knees and pray” that the Supreme 
Court would decide several cases in favor of “traditional” marriage (The Guardian 2015). More 
recently, in 2018, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions cited a Bible verse, Romans 13, in his 
defense of the president’s family separation policy (Zauzmer and McMillan 2018). And in the 
2016 presidential election, even Donald Trump, a candidate better known for his libertine 
lifestyle than any particular devotion to his Christian faith, made a point of mentioning on the 
campaign trail how he was “very proud” to be Protestant as well as the need to “bring 
Christianity back” (CSPAN 2016).  
     In light of these strong associations between Christianity and the political right, it 
understandable that some Americans may have forgotten that at one point many Christian groups 
advocated for progressive social causes. Yet these days, although 78% of Democrats in the 116th 
Congress are Christian and 57% of registered Democratic voters are Christian, the Democratic 
Party stays largely quiet about Christianity (Pew 2019). In fact, if anything, some Democrats 




have been accused of outright hostility to religion, such as when Senator Kamala Harris 
questioned a Republican judicial nominee over his membership in the Knights of Columbus, a 
Catholic fraternal organization (Gabbard 2018). 
      Given that the demographic reality of the Democratic Party is that the majority of 
Democratic voters and politicians are Christian, this paper proposes that Democrats need not 
cede Christian discourse to the Republican Party. To contextualize this proposal, the paper’s first 
section conducts a brief overview of the historical relationship between Christianity and 
progressivism in America and observes that Christians of a variety of denominations have often 
stood at the forefront of progressive causes. In the second section, the paper uses extant research 
in political psychology to propose a theoretical argument for how Christian appeals from 
Democratic politicians might positively impact liberal voters’ political decision-making. In the 
third section, the paper concludes with a series of case studies that further explicates the theory 
by demonstrating its mechanisms in action in the rhetoric of three prominent Democratic 
politicians. Specifically, the case studies examine Barack Obama’s Christian rhetoric in which all 
the elements in the theory are present, John Kerry’s Christian rhetoric that lacks moral 
frameworks for his policy proposals, and Hillary Clinton’s Christian rhetoric that lacks a strong 
connecting narrative. The case study analysis concludes that even in the second and third cases 
that are not entirely congruent with the theory, Democrats can still positively influence liberal 
voters’ political decision-making by integrating Christian language into their political appeals.  
Christian Activism for Progressive Causes 
Charles Finney and the Abolitionism of Early Evangelical Protestants  
     In 2018, Americans may often associate the term “evangelical” with the political right, and 
for good reason: men like Jerry Falwell Sr. (the founder of the Moral Majority) and Pat 




Robertson (erstwhile presidential candidate), two of the most famous evangelical preachers of 
the late 20th century, were both staunch social conservatives who supported Republican 
presidents (FitzGerald 2017). However, Falwell and Robertson were only the latest generations 
of evangelicals in a religious tradition that stretches back to colonial America. Throughout 
American history, there has never been a monolithic evangelicalism. In centuries past, 
evangelicals resided in the North and the South, the frontier and the city. Some were biblical 
literalists and theological conservatives who exhorted the church to stay out of politics, while 
others broke from the strict doctrinal confines of their progenitors. The common theological 
thread for these Christian men and women was the centrality of an experience of spiritual rebirth 
to their faith as well as their emphasis on the redeeming power of Christ on the cross (637).  
     In America’s early days, the dominant religion was Puritanism. As James Morone (2003) 
points out, “by 1640, the New England Puritans made up more than half the European population 
in what would become the original United States” (Morone 2003: 31). These Puritans were 
Protestants who rejected the Church of England’s style and doctrines. They decried the elaborate 
trappings of Anglican ritual, in which they saw echoes of the reviled liturgy of the Catholic 
Church, and they rejected the Anglicans’ policy of open church membership, instead deciding to 
limited membership in their churches to those who “could demonstrate God’s grace moving 
within them” (37). 
    Over time, the Puritans lost their monopoly on American religion. In the middle of the 18th 
century, New England preachers like Jonathan Edwards and George Whitefield became the foci 
of what historians call “The Great Awakening,” a restructuring of American theology that 
emphasized an individual’s personal relationship with Christ via an experience of spiritual 
rebirth (FitzGerald 2017:19). Whitefield and his followers, like Gilbert Tennant, drew huge 




crowds at religious revivals as they railed against “unconverted” ministers, or ministers who had 
not acknowledged or experienced a singular moment of spiritual conversion (ibid). To a certain 
extent, The Great Awakening democratized American Christianity: individuals who claimed to 
have experienced a spiritual rebirth began to preach in public, unannounced and without 
permission from local authorities (21). Soon, a new class of itinerant preachers emerged and 
spread their message to the colonial frontier, where they formed local churches that existed 
independently of preexisting ecumenical institutions (23). By 1743, several new denominations 
had emerged form the tumult, including the Separate Baptists, the New Side Presbyterians, and 
the Methodists, who all shared the same democratizing ethos that deemphasized the authority of 
the clergy and focused on an individual’s personal relationship with Christ (24). People who 
belonged to these denominations became known as “evangelicals,” a word derived from the 
Greek “euangelion,” meaning “gospel” or “good news” (Merritt 2015).  
      At the beginning of the 19th century, another series of religious revivals once again changed 
the landscape of American Protestantism. Known as the Second Great Awakening, these revivals 
began in Cane Ridge, Kentucky at a gathering of 10,000 people who camped for days listening to 
the sermons of itinerant preachers. While they listened, many attendees experienced “religious 
ecstasies” such as speaking in tongues (glossolalia), fainting, dancing, and singing (FitzGerald 
2017: 26). The preachers of the Second Great Awakening elaborated on the message of their 
predecessors a half-century earlier as they advocated for a relationship between God and human 
beings in which any mediating institutions between an individual and God were at best 
superfluous and at worst corrupt (29). Preachers like John Leland, a prominent Baptist, not only 
“opposed all forms of clerical organization,” but also “maintained that each individual had right 
to his own interpretation of the scriptures,” while others, such as Alexander Campbell, the son of 




Ulster Presbyterians, insisted that “people could read the ‘plain facts’ of the Bible for 
themselves” (29, 30).  
     Leland and Campbell’s extreme version of sola scriptura (no creed but the Bible), resonated 
with a rebellious America “ingrained” with antitraditionalism stemming from “struggle against 
Roman Catholic traditions, and then promoted among early-national Americans by the 
democratic individualism arising from the Revolution” (Noll 2002: 379). This “Revolutionary 
alliance between newly empowered ordinary people and the traditional authority of the Bible” 
would soon cause deep fissures within the evangelical population as questions of biblical 
teachings on slavery came to a head in the Civil War (379). Preachers and ministers who shared 
Leland and Campbell’s ideological bent, called antiformalists, adhered to a variety of evangelical 
Christianity that was “frankly sectarian, emotional, apocalyptic…[and] marked by great 
solicitude for spiritual liberty” (176). These men would eventually defend slavery on theological 
and hermeneutical grounds. However, there was another group of evangelical thinkers and 
preachers based in Northern cities who were led and inspired by a man of particular import to the 
history of the religious left: Charles Grandison Finney (379).  
     Born in 1792, Finney started his career as a lawyer before becoming an itinerant revivalist 
preacher following a conversion experience in his late twenties (FitzGerald 2017: 35). Using a 
forceful and logical preaching style influenced by his background in law, Finney quickly 
developed a reputation as a formidable preacher whose sermons “produced powerful emotional 
reactions, even among merchants and lawyers who had attended church for years and sat 
unmoved through other revivals” (36). He traveled the country, emphasizing that Christians “had 




a duty to…work for the attainment of God’s kingdom on earth1” by “[ridding] the world of its 
‘great and sore evils’” (37).  
     One of the evils that Finney focused on in particular was slavery. Finney refused to allow 
slaveholders to take communion and urged Christians to publically denounce slavery (308). His 
powerful anti-slavery message won him the support of two wealthy philanthropists on the East 
Coast, Arthur and Lewis Tappan, a pair of silk merchants who founded the American Anti-
Slavery Society and took it upon themselves to invest in a certain “struggling manual labor 
college” in Oberlin, Ohio (FitzGerald 2017: 41). Many of Finney’s converts and protégés 
enrolled at Oberlin, and soon Finney himself accepted a professorship there2 to teach theology 
(43). Before long, “thanks to Finney’s celebrity, Oberlin grew apace, and under his influence it 
became a center of progressive evangelical Christianity” (43). In fact, it was Finney who stood 
before Oberlin’s board of directors and insisted that they accept black students as well as white 
(43).  
     At Oberlin, Finney advanced a particular theological idea called “perfectionism,” which was a 
modification of John Wesley’s (the founder of Methodism) concept of “entire sanctification” 
(44, Noll 2002: 335). Frances FitzGerald (2017) describes how  
To [Finney], sanctification meant “a higher and more stable form of the Christian life” in 
which Christians lived in perfect obedience to God’s law and devoted themselves 
completely to loving God and their neighbors…in Finney’s view, all Christians…were 
subject to temptation, to backsliding, and even to losing their salvation. All he was really 
																																																								
1 This doctrine, that the Second Coming of Christ would usher in a reign of peace and prosperity, 
is known as postmillennialism. 
2 Or rather, here.  




proposing was that Christians could grow in their faith and act more as Christ would have 
them (FitzGerald 2017: 44).  
In accordance with this theological proposal, Finney told Christians in his sermons that “piety 
and personal morality were not enough: Christians had to prove ‘useful in the highest degree 
possible’ in advancing God’s kingdom” (39). He elaborates on this idea in Lectures on 
Revivalism in which he writes, “[people] are moral agents, and have the powers which God 
requires them to exercise” (Noll 2002: 307). Finney’s perfectionism also demarked him as a 
theological opponent of many Southern Protestant denominations that embraced a doctrine called 
“the Spirituality of the church.” This doctrine, “generally accepted by southern 
evangelicals…held that ‘the Church, as an order of grace, was permitted no official involvement 
in the social reform of the state, an order merely of justice’” (FitzGerald 2017: 52).  While 
historians such as Noll (2002) and FitzGerald (2017) regard this doctrine as essentially an excuse 
to avoid an discussion of slavery, Noll (2002) does note its theological bases, including the belief 
that “God, rather than humans,” was the agent of social change and that reformist “activism 
meant a sinful replacement of dependency upon God with idolatrous reliance upon the self” 
(Noll 2002: 312). 
   Adherents to the spirituality of the church were in many ways the theological opposites of 
Finney and his Oberlin fellows, who believed that individuals were “subjects of moral 
obligation” who had “a call to…ethical seriousness and a belief in God’s…readiness to 
transform the present world through the Holy Spirit” (312, FitzGerald 2017: 44). Yet despite 
Finney’s emphasis on moral agency, his primary focus remained on individual salvation and the 
subsequent goal of attaining entire sanctification, or perfectionism. For Finney, perfectionism 
was essentially a spiritual matter (Noll 2002: 308). However, the logical consequence of 




individuals becoming more Christ-like in a spiritual sense was that  “the more people converted 
to Christianity, the more righteous society would become” (Evans 2017: 23). It is important to 
note this theological distinction. Unlike the intellectual leaders of the Social Gospel in the 20th 
century, Finney’s theology did not yet directly connect faith and works. To be sure, the 
elimination of social ills was the natural conclusion of perfectionism; however, Finney first and 
foremost maintained that individual righteousness born out of a conversion experience was the 
proper avenue towards building the kingdom of God.  
     Finney’s perfectionism is an early example of how evangelical Christianity is compatible with 
progressivism. By calling on individuals to become more Christ-like, Finney was asking them to 
attempt to emulate a sinless life of righteousness in the face of temptation and tribulation. He 
believed that if more people could truly love God and their neighbors, society would 
fundamentally improve. Today’s Protestant Democrats can look to Finney as an example of how 
a theology of closeness to Christ can lead to tangible social action. Evangelical theologies and 
attitudes are by no means the antithesis to progressive politics. If Finney could invoke closeness 
to Christ as he sought to uproot the horror of slavery, it seems plausible that modern Christian 
Democrats could discuss their own faith as they campaign against any one of the challenges 
facing America today.  
The Social Gospel: Modernist Protestantism and Social Reform in the Early 20th Century 
     Charles Finney, though criticized by some of his contemporaries for his advancement of 
perfectionism, was not a “modernist” Protestant theologian. By contrast, Walter Rauschenbusch, 
the intellectual founder of the Social Gospel movement, most certainly was. Unlike Finney, 
Rauschenbusch developed a theology that revolved around the importance of works to faith. 
Born in Rochester, New York to a German father in 1861, Rauschenbusch attended school in 




Germany before entering the Rochester Theological Seminary in 1883 (Minus 1988: 2). After 
completing his ministerial training, Rauschenbusch was assigned to a German Baptist church in 
the heart of New York City (60). Rauschenbusch’s experience in New York opened his eyes to 
the miseries of the urban underclass: crowded tenements, disease, and abject poverty (ibid). 
Soon, he began to ponder how his faith might help him address the societal conditions around 
him. At first, he struggled to conceive of a new theology, as he had been educated in an 
evangelical tradition that eschewed “mere questions of mine and thine” and did not explicitly 
connect faith to works. Instead, its mission was “to save the immortal souls of men” (61, 67). 
However, Rauschenbusch eventually made an intellectual breakthrough when he heard a 
Catholic priest endorse a socialist mayoral candidate in New York by quoting the Lord’s Prayer: 
“Thy Kingdom come! Thy will be done on earth…” (62).  
     This phrase galvanized Rauschenbusch’s creation of a modernist Protestant theology that 
focused on the centrality of works to faith. First, he joined the Society of Christian Socialists, a 
group whose mission was to “awaken members of Christian churches to the fact that the 
teachings of Jesus Christ lead directly to some specific form or forms of socialism” (65). Several 
years later, Rauschenbusch founded his own society called the Brotherhood of the Kingdom 
(85). One of his first actions as founder was to write a series of pamphlets articulating his vision 
of what would become known as the Social Gospel. In these pamphlets, Rauschenbusch 
condemned the traditional evangelical focus on personal salvation at the expense of the creation 
of “a collective Kingdom of God on earth” (88, 89). He recast the evangelical mission as “the 
evangelization of the world” that was “to be realized here and now” through “the spread of the 
spirit of Christ in the political, industrial, social, scientific and artistic life of humanity” (ibid).  




     FitzGerald (2017) explains how Rauschenbusch’s historical importance derives “less from his 
policy prescriptions than from his evangelical piety and his use of modern scholarship on the 
New testament to articulate the Social Gospel” (FitzGerald 2017: 68). For example, in his book 
The Social Principles of Jesus, Rauschenbusch used scripture “to formulate in simple 
propositions the fundamental convictions of Jesus about the social and ethical relations and 
duties of men” (Rauschenbusch 1916: 1). In this volume, Rauschenbusch continued to develop 
the connection between works and faith that forms the foundation of the Social Gospel. He 
quotes Matthew 25i to justify his conception of a Christian life that is judged “Not by creed and 
church questions, but by our human relations…by our practical solidarity with our fellow-men” 
(41). To remain “apathetic” to social problems meant eternal condemnation at the hands of 
Christ (ibid).  
     Rauschenbusch’s new conception of a Christianity that worked to improve the human 
condition captured the minds of subsequent generations of public servants, church leaders, and 
activists. First, Evans (2017) describes how “many New Deal priorities…have roots in the 
worldview of the social gospel” (Evans 2017: 147). He states that  
[Franklin] Roosevelt’s cabinet included individuals who endorsed many aspects of social 
gospel thinking, in particular his secretary of the interior, Frances Perkins, as well as 
Harry Hopkins, head of the New Deal’s Works Progress Administration and one of 
Roosevelt’s most important advisors (ibid).  
Rauschenbusch also succeeded in persuading ecumenical institutions such as the Federal Council 
of Churches to adopt tenets of the Social Gospel into their mission statements and their 
charitable endeavors (Evans 2018). And years later, as Martin Luther King Jr. stood before a 
nation and demanded racial equality, King credited Rauschenbusch for inspiring his belief that a 




Christianity which “‘professes to be concerned about the souls of men and is not concerned 
about the social and economic conditions that scar the soul, is a spiritually moribund religion 
only waiting for the day to be buried’” (Evans 2017: 1).  
     In short, Rauschenbusch’s conception of a Christianity dedicated to remedying worldly 
injustice inspired American Protestants throughout the 20th century to advocate for progressive 
causes. When he reframed evangelicalism to encapsulate the creation of a more perfect godly 
society in the here and now, he provided a religious justification for public servants and 
community leaders to advocate for structural changes in American society aimed at uplifting the 
most vulnerable. Given that the Social Gospel helped inspire the most famous set of liberal 
public policy reforms in American history, the New Deal, it seems plausible that today’s 
Protestant Democrats might consider drawing upon their faith to justify their own ambitious 
policy proposals.  
Vatican II and Progressive Catholic Activism in the Mid-20th Century  
    After exploring two strands of American Protestantism, we now turn to Catholicism, the 
second largest Christian denomination in the United States (Pew 2017). By the mid-20th century, 
fear and mistrust of Catholics had begun to subside as more and more Catholics moved slowly 
into the middle class due to educational opportunities afforded to them by the GI Bill (Scribner 
2015: 3). Although several Protestant ecclesiastical organizations continued to issue statements 
condemning Catholics in inflammatory terms, such as when the National Association of 
Evangelicals passed a resolution declaring that the Catholic Church propagated “Satanic 
ideologies,” by and large, by the 1960s, American Catholics were no longer cultural pariahs; 
they even managed to help elect a coreligionist, John F. Kennedy, to the presidency of the United 
States (ibid).  




     The 1960s was a formative decade in the history of Roman Catholicism. Vatican II, the first 
ecumenical council called by a pope in one hundred years, fundamentally transformed the 
Church when it began in 1959. Not only did Vatican II permit presiders to say the Mass in the 
vernacular rather than Latin, it also issued theologically progressive declarations such as Nostra 
Aetate, which acknowledges the legitimacy and worth of other world religions. This spirit of 
reform extended to matters of racial justice. John McGreevy (1996) describes how some 
Catholics viewed certain theological proclamations that originated from Vatican II as a call to 
action on civil rights. For example, Vatican II reformulated the relationship between the Church 
and its constituent members in universal language by describing them as “the people of God” 
(McGreevy 1996: 160) Moreover, the council “emphasized that a truly Catholic Church placed 
its ‘concern…first of all on those who are especially lowly, poor and weak’” (ibid). Other 
conciliar documents like Gaudium et Spes also highlighted the Catholic duty to serve and “to 
rescue” while being “alert to the ‘signs of the times’” (ibid).  
     The Church’s stance on racial justice continued to crystalize as the decade progressed. In 
1963, Pope John XXIII issued Pacem in Terris, an encyclical that explicitly condemned racial 
discrimination, and the very next year, Martin Luther King Jr. met with Pope Paul VI, who 
assured him that the Church supported the black struggle for civil rights in the United States 
(152). Sure enough, during the Selma to Montgomery March in 1965, Catholic clergy and 
laypeople heeded King’s request for aid and flooded into Alabama (155). Images of priests in 
collars and nuns in habits marching with King and other activists appeared in newspapers around 
the country, sending an unmistakable signal that Catholics would not sit out the fight for racial 
equality (156). After Selma, Catholic activism continued. In Milwaukee, one of the most 
segregated cities in America, Father James Groppi, one of the priests who had marched in Selma, 




organized daily marches into the city’s predominantly white South Side until the city council 
passed an open housing ordinance (202). Groppi also engaged in other kinds of activism, such as 
chaining himself to a school construction site to protest school segregation; his unflagging 
commitment to the black cause earned him individual praise from King himself (ibid).  
     In certain areas of the country, the assimilated racism of Catholic immigrant populations like 
the Irish and the Polish complicated the Church’s stand against segregation by stifling the 
activism of the clergy (McGreevy 1996). However, while it is true that certain segments of 
Catholic America in the 20th century were not exactly shining beacons of liberalism, there 
nonetheless existed a strong tradition of Catholic association with the politics of the left. One 
figure in particular embodied this connection. Her name was Dorothy Day.  
      Dorothy Day (1897-1980) founded the Catholic Worker movement in 1933 when she 
distributed the first copies of an eponymous newspaper during a Communist rally in Union 
Square in New York City (Davies 2017, Roberts 1984: 2). Day converted to Catholicism as an 
adult after a whirlwind adolescence in which she was arrested at the age of twenty for 
participating in a suffragist demonstration and interviewed Leon Troksty while working for a 
socialist newspaper (Davies 2017). Soon after she became a Catholic, Day met Peter Maurin, a 
French itinerant Catholic activist. Together, they started the Catholic Worker movement 
(Rademacher 2018: 91). Influenced by writers such as Kropotkin and Tolstoy, Day freely 
described the Catholic Workers as an anarchist movement in which membership “involved freely 
choosing to serve the poor out of love rather than obligation…even if this choice led to 
confrontation with ecclesiastical and civil officials” (ibid). In accordance with the Church’s 
teachings on the Corporal and Spiritual Works of Mercy (derived from the words and deeds of 
Christ as recorded in the Gospels) Day and Maurin set up hospitality houses in New York City 




where they housed and fed all comers while living in poverty themselves (Davies 2017, 
Rademacher 2018).  
     Day’s legacy of radicalism extends beyond serving the poor3 in radical cohabitation. 
Throughout her life, she remained committed to a philosophy of absolute nonviolence. Unlike 
prominent Catholic clergymen in the ‘30s and ‘40s, Day rejected theologian Thomas Aquinas’s 
doctrine of jus ad bellum and condemned war in all of its forms, including World War II (Krupa 
2018: 194). Via The Catholic Worker, she spoke out against Roosevelt’s internment of Japanese-
Americans, eviscerated Truman’s decision to bomb Nagasaki and Hiroshima, and later, in the 
‘50s and ‘60s, was arrested for refusing to participate in air-raid drills, choosing instead to sit in 
the street in silent protest of violence in all its forms (195). Although these positions lost her 
support amongst some elements of the Church, Day maintained that her writings and actions 
stemmed from “the nonviolent love ethic” of Christ (Coy 2018: 174).  
     Father Groppi and Dorothy Day are but two examples of Catholic activists over the years who 
have fought for progressive social causes. One could spill much ink, for example, recounting 
César Chávez’s leadership of Californian farm workers in a strike that galvanized the support of 
Church officials and Catholic politicians such as Bobby Kennedy. Yet suffice it to say that the 
20th century Catholics had a moral voice, and that moral voice often sang in harmony with that of 
the political Left. Admittedly, while modern Catholic Democrats may feel constrained in 
invoking their faith to justify their policy stances due to the Church’s vehemently anti-abortion 
stance, which I discuss in section three, throughout history, Catholics have understood the 
Church’s moral teachings to apply to issues besides abortion. In the 20th century, the Church and 
its constituent members have stood firmly on the side of progressive causes like racial equality, 
																																																								
3 As of 2017, there are some 250 hospitality houses around the world, and The Catholic Worker 
(the publication) continues to be distributed to this day (Davies 2017).   




peace activism, and alleviating the plight of the poor. There is a good deal of historical precedent 
that legitimizes Catholic Democrats bringing their faith into the public sphere as they seek to 
explain their support for progressive causes.   
A Theory of Democratic Christian Appeals 
     At the very least, figures like Finney, Rauschenbusch, Fr. Groppi, and Day demonstrate that 
Christianity is not incompatible with liberal causes. The fact is, Christian individuals such as 
these often stood at the forefront of progressive battles against a wide array of social ills. In light 
of the history of Christian advocacy for progressive causes throughout American history, the 
absence of Christian appeals amongst modern Democrats presents a puzzle to political observers. 
After all, 222 of the 282 Democrats in Congress are Christians, and nearly 60% of Americans 
who identify as Democrats are Christian as well (Pew 2019). Moreover, some of the biggest 
names in the Democratic Party, including Cory Booker, Elizabeth Warren, Nancy Pelosi, Hillary 
Clinton, Joe Biden, and Barack Obama, are devout Christians (Foer 2018, Pew 2019, Mitchell 
2009, Cox 2015, Hertzke, Olson, den Dulk, and Fowler 2018). Yet Democrats do not exactly 
trumpet their Christianity from the rooftops. Unlike their counterparts on the right, it would be 
unthinkable for a 2020 Democratic presidential candidate to echo G.H.W. Bush’s declaration 
that “I believe with all my heart that one cannot be president without a belief in God” (Lieven 
2012: 145).   
     This section asks, “How might Christian appeals from Democratic politicians influence 
liberal voters' political decision-making?” Answering this question matters because history 
shows us that there is political power in religious appeals. Recall Charles Finney, who called 
upon all Christians to join the abolitionist cause, and Walter Rauschenbusch, who urged 
Christians to take their faith to the streets and build the Kingdom of God on earth. Yet despite 
this history, right now, many Christian Democrats do not use Christian appeals in their political 




rhetoric (Beinart 2019). In an effort to encourage Christian Democrats to reexamine their 
relationship with religion in the political arena, this section will use extant research in political 
psychology to formulate a theory about how and why Christian appeals might be effective 
electoral tools for Democratic candidates who seek to earn the support of liberal voters.  
Literature Review 
          Generations of political scientists have sought a better understanding of how and why 
voters choose whom and what to vote for. The conventional wisdom regarding vote choice 
dating back to Aristotle casts the voting process as an instance of rational choice (Popkin 1994). 
According to these scholars, voters can be categorized as homo economicus, or people who 
decide whom to vote for based solely on a dispassionate cost-benefit analysis of how a 
candidate’s policies help them or hurt them (Downs 1957, Campbell et al. 1960, Key 1966, 
Kramer 1971, Haidt 2012). However, recent scholarship has challenged the notion that vote 
choice and political opinion formation is an entirely rational process (Demasio 1994, Marcus et 
al. 2000, Mendelberg 2001, Lodge and Taber 2013). Some scholars, such as Marcus et al. 
(2000), Mendelberg (2001), and Lodge and Taber (2013) demonstrate that truly rational choice is 
impossible due to a myriad of subconscious cognitive processes that automatically bias our 
downstream decision-making in a matter of milliseconds. Still others, such as Popkin (1994), 
frame vote choice in terms of low-information rationality that relies on heuristics, or cognitive 
shortcuts, to arrive at a decision. Finally, scholars like Haidt (2012) and Lakoff (2002) 
contextualize vote choice as taking place within moral systems or matrices that guide political 
decision-making.  
     In many ways, this new generation of scholarship should please political practitioners. If 
citizens do not vote by simply weighing competing policy platforms and arriving at a reasoned 




conclusion as to which one is more beneficial for their own economic wellbeing, political 
campaigns and the accompanying institutions that mediate between candidates and voters remain 
extraordinarily important to how voters decide. For example, scholars have shown that political 
debates, candidate talk-show appearances, and the tone and substance of press coverage, just to 
name a few factors, all affect how voters conceive of the political reality that informs their voting 
decision (McKinney and Warner 2013, Parkin 2014, Wolfsfeld 2011). Moreover, if vote choice 
is indeed a process that transcends the bounds of rational choice, the rhetoric candidates use 
takes on an added significance as well. Postman (1985) presciently argues the language 
candidates use in televised campaign ads, for example, “puts forth a psychological theory of 
unique axioms:…all problems are solvable, that they are solvable fast, and that they are solvable 
through the interventions of technology, techniques, and chemistry” (Postman 1985: 130).   
     What Postman (1985) means here is modern political candidates must use language and 
symbols to market themselves, to create an appealing self-portrait “whose image is best in 
touching and soothing the deep reaches of [voters’] discontent” (135). Political decision-making, 
in other words, is fundamentally linked to emotion. Neuroscientists and political psychologists 
agree that the way we experience emotion is underpinned by a basic organizational principle of 
the brain called “approach/withdraw” (Westen et al. 2006, Westen 2007, J. Haidt personal 
correspondence, December 18, 2018). Haidt (2012) articulates the basics of this principle quite 
simply when he describes how “brains evaluate everything in terms of potential threat or benefit 
to the self, and then adjust behavior to get more of the good stuff and less of the bad” (Haidt 
2012: 64).  
   Westen et al. (2006) and Westen (2007) argue that the influence of approach/withdraw also 
extends to components of automatic subconscious decision-making processes such as affective 




tagging. In psychology, “affect” refers to a positive or negative feeling, while affective tagging 
refers to the theory that the vast majority of cognitive concepts are associated with positive or 
negative affect (Taber and Lodge 2013). Westen at al. (2006) explain how the 
approach/withdraw principle affects subconscious decision-making processes when they write, 
“processes of approach and avoidance, motivated by affect or anticipated affect, may apply to 
motivated reasoning, such that people will implicitly approach and avoid judgments based on 
their emotional associations” (Westen et al. 2006, Schlaghecken and Eimer 2004). Studies have 
shown how motivated reasoning occurs in the context of political decision-making, moral 
reasoning, and stereotyping (Westen et al. 2006, Haidt, Koller, and Dias 1993, Rozin et al. 
1999).  
     In light of this body of research, candidates who treat elections as simply a contest between 
two competing policy platforms that voters evaluate rationally based on their own self-interest do 
so at their own peril. Several authors have pointed out that Democratic candidates are guilty of 
adhering to this misconception about what voting entails while many Republicans, on the other 
hand, have embraced this updated paradigm of voter behavior by directing their electoral 
messaging at voters’ emotions (Westen 2007, Ricci 2011, Ricci 2016). Meanwhile, those 
Democrats who try to walk voters through the specifics of a policy proposal are easily brushed 
off by their conservative opponents, such as when George W. Bush famously dismissed Al 
Gore’s concern over his tax plan’s effect on income inequality as “fuzzy math” in one of the 
2000 presidential debates (Berke 2000). Given that voters are more likely to participate in 
politics if they experience positive feelings towards a candidate, it is possible that Democrats 
who fail to generate emotional responses in their voters may find themselves at an electoral 




disadvantage compared to a Republican opponent who deliberately targets voters’ emotions 
(Westen 2007: 70, Parkin 2014: 133, 153).  
     One of the ways Democrats could target voters’ emotions is by framing policy issues in moral 
language. Studies show that people’s emotions are activated over the course of arriving at moral 
judgments (Rozin et al. 1999, Green et al. 2001, Sanfey et al. 2003, Jones and Fitness 2008, Blair 
2007, Huebner, Dwyer, and Hauser 2008, White et al. 2017). If candidates can use moral 
frameworks to generate positive affect about cognitive objects associated with their candidacy, 
voters’ overall attitudes towards their candidacies will improve (Lodge and Taber: 30). This 
attitude improvement occurs because a) all cognitive objects are affectively tagged (researchers 
call this “hot cognition”), b) cognitive objects are often connected in a predetermined schema, 
and c) the more objects in voter’s schema about a candidate that are associated with positive 
affect, the more positive the voter’s overall attitude towards the candidate will be (Lodge and 
Taber 2013: 43). Therefore, in order to better target liberal voters’ emotions, Democrats might 
heed the political scientists, sociologists, and philosophers who write about the role narrative 
plays in situating ourselves in a moral landscape (Smith 2003, Patterson and Monroe 1988, 
Bruner 1996, Somers and Gibson 1995).  
     I argue that Democrats can use Christian language to frame their policy proposals in moral 
narratives in order to activate voters’ emotions and motivate them to support their candidacies. 
According to scholars like Haidt (2012) and Lakoff (2002), liberal voters think about morality 
through particular psychological frameworks. I posit that invoking Christian language would 
allow Democrats to engage with these frameworks in a holistic way that effectively positions 
them to activate emotional responses in liberal voters as they arrive at moral judgments.  
 




Narrative, Morality, and Emotion  
     Sociologists as well as political theorists agree on the important roles narratives play in our 
lives (McNeill 1982, Smith 2003, Patterson and Monroe 1988, Bruner 1996, Somers and Gibson 
1995). Somers and Gibson (1995) state that stories guide “people to act in certain ways and not 
others” (Somers and Gibson 1995: 2). Stories that tell us how we should act are not simply fables 
teaching us how to conduct cost-benefit analyses. On the contrary: as Bruner (1996) puts it, 
“finding a place in the world, for all that it implicates in the immediacy of home, mate, job, and 
friends, is ultimately an act of imagination” (Bruner 1996: 41). Bruner’s (1996) use of the word 
“imagination” indicates that narratives are not always the products of dispassionate reasoning. 
Rather, narratives are constructed by the collective imaginations of various societal, cultural, and 
religious forces, as well as the imagination of the individual. 
      One of America’s political parties seems to grasp the important political implications of 
crafting a powerful narrative. Republicans from Orange County to Staten Island tell a similar 
story about the challenges America faces (governmental overreach, the fraying of America’s 
moral fabric), who or what is at fault for these challenges (secularism, socialism, government 
bureaucrats, and free-riders), and how we fix them (a renewed commitment to personal 
responsibility, religion, and a redistribution of power to local governments) (Ricci 2011, Ricci 
2016, Smith 2003). Recently, Donald Trump has absconded with this message and made it even 
simpler: America was once great, it no longer is, and we should do everything in our power to 
return it to greatness. With Make America Great Again (MAGA) as the backdrop to campaigns 
across the country, Republicans deliver voters a simple message: America, the land of perfect 
righteousness and global agent of good, is slipping (Lieven 2012). Republicans are patriots who 
want to return America to its glory days, whether they think of this economically (as in a revival 




of coal or manufacturing) or socially (back to a time before political correctness, say). It is 
obviously important for folks to listen to them and care about their story because with every 
passing second, America slides further and further from greatness. As such, voters have a moral 
imperative to act in support of Republican candidates and by extension, America itself. This 
story can inspire a range of emotions in voters—excitement, anxiety, pride, and even 
humiliation—emotions that in turn motivate political behavior (Westen 2007: 70, Fukayama 
2018: 92, Lieven 2012: 82).  
     Politicians who use stories to take aim at voters’ emotions are hardly employing a novel 
political strategy. As we have seen, in centuries past, some public figures used Christianity as the 
backbone of their political narratives as they called Americans into action for progressive causes. 
Nonetheless, many modern Democrats do not tell stories. Consequently, they miss an 
opportunity to appeal to voters’ emotions. Westen (2007) sums up the party’s struggles with 
“emotionally compelling” narratives when he bemoans Democrats’ failure to use stories that 
justify their candidacies and policy proposals. He writes, “the Left has no brand, no counter-
brand, no master narrative…instead, every Democrat who runs for office…has to reinvent what 
it means to be a Democrat, using his or her own words and concepts” (Westen 2007: 146, 169).  
     Ricci (2016) attributes the storytelling-adverse character of Democrats to the particulars of 
liberalism as a political philosophy when he states, “liberals as a class simply don’t see the world 
in terms of large shared stories” (Ricci 2016: 64). After all, liberalism has roots in Enlightenment 
humanism, a tradition that “rejected the mythical, theological, transcendental, or metaphysical 
explanations that used to justify large institutions” (192). It makes sense, therefore, that liberals 
avoid using stories to frame their understanding of the world, at least in the public sphere, and 
gravitate instead towards an empirical politics comprised of a list of policy proposals dedicated 




to “citing facts...and revising circumstances” rather than “advocating fundamental beliefs” (Ricci 
2016: 95). William McNeill warns of the political consequences of this lack of storytelling when 
he writes, “in the absence of believable myths, coherent public action becomes very difficult to 
improvise or sustain” because voters may lack the motivation to participate in politics (McNeill 
1982: 1). Miller (2013) asserts that the first question citizens ask themselves about politics is, 
“Do I want to participate?” (Miller 2013: 210). Some liberal-leaning voters may very well 
answer this question in the negative after listening to Democratic candidates who offer them 
bland buffets of policy proposals without a common narrative thread to bind them together: cut 
carbon emissions by exactly 1.2%; leave Syria in 6.5 months; offer faster broadband speeds for 
rural areas.  
     With this in mind, the challenge for politicians, and for Democrats in particular, becomes how 
to generate an emotional response in voters. As Westen (2007) puts it, “we do not pay attention 
to arguments unless they engender our interest, enthusiasm, fear, anger, or contempt. We are not 
moved by leaders with whom we do not feel an emotional resonance” (Westen 2007: 16). 
Democrats can accomplish this by constructing narratives that appeal to voters’ sense of 
morality. Research in neuroscience and moral psychology suggests that emotion is intrinsically 
connected to moral reasoning (Rozin et al. 1999, Green et al. 2001, Sanfey et al. 2003, Jones and 
Fitness 2008, Blair 2007, Huebner, Dwyer, and Hauser 2008, White et al. 2017). One study in 
particular by Haidt, Koller, and Dias (1993) highlights the connection between emotion (or 
affect) and moral judgments and is worth examining in more detail. In this study, researchers 
presented subjects of varying socioeconomic status (SES) in Brazil and the United States with 
“affectively loaded stories” of harmless taboo violations (Haidt, Koller, and Dias 1993: 615). 




Then, they asked them if the action in the story4 was a) morally wrong and b) if someone was 
harmed by the action. The authors found that “most of [the] subjects said that the harmless-taboo 
violations were universally wrong even though they harmed nobody,” a conclusion that appears 
irrational to proponents of a harm-based morality like that of the liberal political philosopher 
John Stuart Mill (Haidt 2012: 26).  
     In other words, emotions guide moral reasoning, so much so that our explanations for moral 
judgments may actually be post-hoc rationalizations for a decision driven by affect (Greene and 
Haidt 2002, Haidt, Koller, and Dias 1993, Haidt 2012, Lodge and Taber 2013). Fortunately for 
Democrats seeking to tap into voters’ emotions via their moral reasoning, some of the most 
important narratives in our lives are those that address morality, or the way we treat others and 
ourselves. As we attempt to find a place in the world and figure out a way to organize our 
actions, we cannot avoid questions of morality. Smith (2003) says as much in his book Moral, 
Believing Animals when he writes, “To be a human person…requires locating one’s life within a 
larger moral order by which to know who one is and how one ought to live” (Smith 2003: 118). 
It is clear, then, that the stories that Smith (2003) describes as guiding “how one ought to live” 
and Bruner (1996) describes as “finding a place in the world” necessarily possess moral elements 
or implications (Smith 2003: 118, Bruner 1996: 41).  
     The stories politicians tell are no different in that morality often lies at the heart of political 
stories. Moreover, politicians who make it clear to voters that their policy proposals are grounded 
in a particular moral framework may benefit on Election Day. One study shows that political 
participation increases when voters believe that their preferred political candidate reflects their 
moral values and convictions (Skitka and Bauman 2008).  
																																																								
4 For example, one of the stories describes a woman who finds an unwanted American or 
Brazilian flag in her closet and decides to cut it up and use it as a rag.  




      Unfortunately, if political stories are often moral stories, this leaves some Democrats in a 
double bind. Liberals’ inherent inclination to avoid stories in the public sphere precludes them 
from engaging with voters’ moral matrices, which in turn fails to garner the emotional reactions 
that drive political decision-making. Given that many Republicans do tell these kinds of stories, 
those Democrats who do not arguably make elections more difficult for themselves. To 
complicate matters further, Democrats who struggle with moral language may find themselves at 
a loss in terms of how to tell any stories at all. In order to alleviate this tendency, Democrats 
might consider drawing upon Christian language to craft moral stories that arouse voters’ 
emotions. Smith (2003) explains that morality is a central concern of religion when he writes, 
“religion is…about the proper organization and right guidance of life. Religion tells 
people…what are good, right, true, wise, and worthy desires, thoughts, feelings, values, 
practices, actions, and interactions (Smith 2003: 99). Christianity fits into this description. From 
the Ten Commandments to the Beatitudes, Christianity inarguably urges its followers to act 
within a particular moral system. Famous Christian figures like Charles Finney and Walter 
Rauschenbusch preached this message as well. In their eyes, Christians had a moral, faith-based 
duty to act in certain ways. Accordingly, Democratic politicians who are Christian may find that 
their faith provides them with the language they need to create an effective moral narrative that 
resonates with liberal voters. The next part of this section will analyze this proposal in more 
detail by examining the interaction between Christian language and two different psychological 
models of liberals’ moral matrices.       
  The Interaction of Christian Language with Nurturant Parent Morality  
      What kinds of language might Democrats use as they construct moral narratives with a 
foundation in Christianity? George Lakoff’s (2002) Nurturant Parent Model provides us with a 




starting point for examining which Christian themes might resonate with liberal voters’ moral 
matrices. To begin with, he proposes two divergent cognitive linguistic models of liberal and 
conservative morality. Liberals adhere to a Nurturant Parent Model of morality, and 
conservatives adhere to a Strict Father Model of morality. Each of these models encapsulates and 
prioritizes a “collection of metaphors of morality” which results in the formation of “different 
family-based moral systems…[that] give rise to different forms of moral reasoning” (64). The 
metaphors associated with these models correspond to two different types of “ideal family life” 
(64). 
      Lakoff (2002) introduces the Nurturant Parent Model as follows:  
[there are] preferably two parents, but perhaps only one. If two, the parents share 
household responsibilities. The primal experience behind this model is one of being cared 
for and cared about, having one’s desires for loving interactions met, living as happily as 
possible, and deriving meaning from mutual interaction and care (Lakoff 2002: 108).  
The most salient aspect of this model as it relates to Christian morality is its emphasis on 
“deriving meaning from mutual interaction and care;” in other words, nurturance (ibid). In the 
model, “a child has a right to nurturance and a parent has a responsibility to provide it” (117). 
The responsibility Lakoff (2002) refers to here not only describes how liberals think about the 
moral duties inherent to the family, but the government as well. Americans, he argues, actually 
understand the nation as a metaphorical family: we talk about a fatherland sending its sons and 
daughters to war; the word “patriot” derives from the Latin word for father, “pater;” the federal 
government is “Uncle Sam.” (154). As such, liberals view politics as well as community and 
family life through identical moral prisms. Just as parents possess a certain authority and 




responsibility with regards to their children, so too does the government possess a certain 
authority and responsibility with regards to its citizens (ibid).  
     Lakoff (2002) proposes a four-part conceptual metaphor that outlines these moral 
responsibilities of parents and governments: "(1) The Community is a Family. (2) Moral Agents 
are Nurturing Parents. (3) People Needing Help are Children Needing Nurturance. (4). Moral 
Action is Nurturance” (ibid). This last metaphor entails two additional important corollaries. 
First, “moral action may require making sacrifices to help truly needy people” (118). Second, 
“community members have a responsibility to see that people needing help in their community 
are helped” (ibid).   
      Christian Democrats could effectively use religious language to interface with this collection 
of metaphors because the morality of the Nurturant Parent Model reflects an understanding of the 
moral obligations inherent to community life that echoes a central Christian doctrine: love one 
another (John 13:34, 1 John 3:11). This simple message, one that lies at the heart of Jesus’s 
teachings in the New Testament, encapsulates Nurturant Parent Morality’s emphasis on 
“deriving meaning from mutual interaction and care” (108). Moreover, other parts of the New 
Testament highlight the centrality of works to Christian faith in a way that fits with the model’s 
second corollary: “community members have a responsibility to see that people needing help in 
their community are helped” (118). For example, James 2:14 says, “What good is it, my brothers, 
if someone says he has faith but does not have works” (James 2:14). Additionally, documents 
issued during Vatican II highlighted the Catholic Church’s concern with helping the most 
vulnerable members of society (McGreevy 1996: 160). Passages like James 2:14 in the Bible 
along with declarations from Vatican II demonstrate how important it is for Christians to take 
moral action in their communities. Doing so is only right if Christians seek to follow Jesus’s 




command to “Love your neighbor as yourself” (Matthew 22:39). The conception of a community 
bound together by love that Jesus articulates in the Gospel of Matthew directly recalls one of the 
corollaries of the Nurturant Parent Model that links the need for moral action in the community 
to the urgency a parent feels when their child needs help.  
     Let’s imagine how Christian Democrats might use this model to ground their policy proposals 
in moral language that tells a story about who they are and why they are advocating for particular 
policy proposals. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) and Conor Lamb (D-PA) are two new 
members of the House of Representatives. While Ocasio-Cortez is widely regarded as one of the 
most liberal Democrats in the 116th Congress, Lamb is a moderate representing a swing district 
in the Pittsburgh suburbs (National Journal 2019). Unsurprisingly, Ocasio-Cortez and Lamb talk 
about policy in different ways. For example, both politicians have sections about the 
environment on their campaign websites. Lamb’s section talks about supporting the oil and gas 
industry’s job-creating properties while defending the government’s ability to punish polluters 
(Lamb 2018). On the other hand, Ocasio-Cortez’s section advocates for a Green New Deal that 
includes a 100% renewable energy economy (Ocasio-Cortez 2018). These goals are significantly 
different and arguably divergent: it seems quite unlikely that Ocasio-Cortez will be interested in 
joining forces with Lamb to help grow the Pennsylvania oil and gas industry.  
      However, both Ocasio-Cortez and Lamb are Catholics. If they wanted to, they could draw 
upon the language of their faith to ground their objectively dissimilar environmental policies in a 
similar moral matrix that signals their role as nurturing moral agents. Here is what Ocasio-




Cortez’s section on the environment might look like if she told a story about her policy that used 
Christian language:5 
Not only does climate change threaten the wellbeing of our planet, it threatens the health 
of our fellow citizens, specifically those in low-income communities. As Matthew 25:31-
46 reminds us, we need to care for “the least of these.” Alex’s Green New Deal will do 
just that. By transitioning to a 100% renewable energy economy by 2035, we can protect 
the most vulnerable Americans from rising sea levels, raging wildfires, and dangerous 
heat waves while simultaneously providing new green jobs for the people that need them 
most.  
 
Now, let’s engage in the same exercise for Lamb:  
I support robust and responsible energy development. Natural gas extraction strengthens 
our district by employing hundreds of our families, friends, and neighbors. I will do 
everything I can to make sure these jobs stay where they are. As Matthew 25:31-46 tells 
us, we have a moral imperative to take care of each other, and that starts with making 
sure that everyone has the chance to find a good, safe middle-class job.  
 
     For Ocasio-Cortez, inserting a religious appeal in her website’s section on the environment 
explains that the policy proposals in her Green New Deal have a moral basis in nurturance, 
specifically nurturance of the most vulnerable members of the national community. The urgency 
this message conveys aligns with the urgency liberal voters feel about helping the disadvantaged, 
given that Nurturant Parent Morality links helping the needy to caring for one’s own children. 
Similarly, for Lamb, adding a religious appeal enables him to justify his dedication to robust 
energy development by situating it in a nurturant moral framework about caring for the 
community via increasing economic opportunity. Matthew 25: 31 helps Lamb implicitly position 
himself as a nurturant parent who wants the best for his district. This positioning directly aligns 
with how the Nurturant Parent Model conceives of the role of government. Finally, citing a verse 
from the Gospel of Matthew tells the same story about both candidates that accomplishes what 
																																																								
5	Some of the language in this section and the subsequent section includes words and phrases 
taken directly from the websites of Ocasio-Cortez and Lamb. 	




Smith (2003) calls “locating one’s life within a larger moral order:” despite their policy 
differences, Ocasio-Cortez and Lamb are people of faith who have committed to public service 
because they feel a moral duty to help their constituents (Smith 2003: 118).  
Christian Language as a Holistic Approach to the Moral Foundations  
     The Nurturant Parent Model provides a starting point for examining what kinds of Christian 
language might resonate with liberal voters’ moral matrices and why that is the case. This section 
expands on this claim by turning to Haidt’s (2012) Moral Foundations theory and analyzing how 
Christian language would allow Democrats to not only interface holistically with each individual 
foundation, but also those foundations that liberals usually tend to ignore or shy away from in 
their political rhetoric.   
     Haidt (2012) argues that human morality has six foundations: Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating, 
Loyalty/Betrayal, Authority/Subversion, Sanctity/Degradation, and Liberty/Oppression (Haidt 
2012). He claims that varying receptiveness to each of these foundations accounts for 
discrepancies in moral reasoning across different cultures and classes (Haidt 2012: 146). These 
foundations, says Haidt (2012) are actually “universal cognitive modules” that evolved to meet 
the primary “adaptive challenges of [human] social life” (ibid). One of these challenges is “the 
fundamental question of animal life: approach or avoid” (64). Accordingly, each of the moral 
foundations has two sides, one that corresponds to “approach” responses and one that 
corresponds to “withdraw” responses.  
     When different cultures and individuals assign different weights to each of the six moral 
foundations, distinct moral matrices emerge. Other cultures’ moral systems appear at best 
incomprehensible and at worst immoral to people adhering to a particular moral matrix. The 
French, for example, view the Islamic teaching requiring women to cover their heads and faces 




as fundamentally at odds with their conception of a liberal democratic society. As a result, in 
2011, France passed a law that made wearing the niqab in public illegal (The Guardian 2018). 
This is an example of a clash between a cultural moral matrix that emphasizes the 
Liberty/Oppression Foundation and one that emphasizes the Sanctity/Degradation Foundation.  
     One of Haidt’s (2012) central proposals in The Righteous Mind is that liberals are mostly 
receptive to just three of the six foundations, Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating, and 
Liberty/Oppression, while conservatives are very receptive to all six (Haidt 2012: 211). He goes 
on to claim that the comparatively narrow spectrum of liberal morality places Democrats at an 
electoral disadvantage because their messages fail to resonate with individuals with broader 
moral matrices that emphasize other foundations such as Authority/Subversion, 
Loyalty/Betrayal, and Sanctity/Degradation (ibid). Moreover, in light of Shklar (1989) and 
Ricci’s (2016) analysis of the oppositional nature of Democratic messages, we can expand upon 
this claim: the Democratic disadvantage with regards to the moral foundations extends beyond a 
three-foundation morality versus a six-foundation morality because Democrats have a tendency 
to utilize messages that emphasize Harm over Care, Cheating over Fairness, and Oppression over 
Liberty. In other words, the content of Democratic political appeals gravitates towards the 
“withdraw” side of the moral foundations. If Democrats were to use Christian language in their 
political messaging, they could effectively engage with the “approach” side of the moral 
foundations as well as the other three foundations that they tend to avoid altogether.  
     Before analyzing the interaction between Christian-inspired language and the moral 
foundations, I will explain why some Democratic messages tend to emphasize the “withdraw” 
sides of the moral foundations over the “approach” sides. Political philosopher Judith Shklar’s 
(1989) term “the liberalism of fear” explains why some Democratic policy proposals have an 




oppositional orientation6 that focuses more on the “withdraw” sides rather than the “approach” 
sides. Shklar (1989) claims that this oppositional orientation is inherent to liberalism as a 
political philosophy (Ricci 2012). She posits that “liberalism must restrict itself to politics and to 
proposals to restrain potential abusers of power in order to lift the burden of fear and favor from 
the shoulders of adult women and men” (Shklar 1989: 31). This statement identifies certain 
ideological constraints on liberal politicians (ibid). Liberals, she argues, make policy in order to 
react to the threat of current or future abuses of power. As a result of “liberalism target[ing] 
different forms of tyranny according to time and place,” Democrats assemble lists of policy 
proposals7 that aim to “mend the defects in modern society” (Ricci 2016: 97, 140). These lists 
are by nature oppositional. As such, they tend to highlight the “withdraw” sides of the three 
moral foundations liberals care most about: Harm in Care/Harm, Cheating in Fairness/Cheating, 
and Oppression in Liberty/Oppression.  
     By alluding to scripture and referencing common Christian themes in their political 
messaging, Democrats could formulate policy proposals that highlight the “approach” side of the 
three liberal moral foundations. Imagine a political appeal from a 2020 Democratic presidential 
candidate like Senator Elizabeth Warren who has made alleviating economic inequality one of 
her signature issues. Senator Warren, a practicing Methodist, might consider citing scripture in 
one of her Iowa stump speeches as she defends, say, the Dodd-Frank Act and a high corporate 
tax rate (Dionne 2012). She could say, “As president I will ensure that powerful Wall Street 
corporations operate within the law, and I would remind them of their Christian duty to 
																																																								
6	Trump has undoubtedly amplified some Democrats’ oppositional tendencies: for example, 
recall Rep. Rashida Tlaib’s exclamation that “We’re gunna impeach the motherfucker!” on the 
night of her swearing-in (Rupar 2019).		
7	For a thorough analysis of liberals and their lists of solutions to social and political ills, see 
Ricci (2016) Chapter 8.   




contribute to the common good. Recall how 1 Timothy 6:18 instructs the rich ‘to do good, to be 
rich in good works, to be generous, ready to share’” (1 Timothy 6:18). This use of scripture 
highlights the Fairness side of Fairness/Cheating better than a message that only highlights 
Cheating (like “break up the banks”). This example demonstrates how Democrats might 
construct political appeals that transcend the limitations of the liberalism of fear and equally 
engage both sides of the moral foundations. Instead of disseminating messages that lean towards 
an emphasis on the “withdraw” sides of the moral foundations, Democrats could disseminate 
“approach” messages of social justice with a Christian underpinning that emphasize compassion, 
empathy, and responsibility.   
     While Democrats might certainly try to focus equally on both sides of the moral foundations 
by using Christian language, the advantages of using such language to more effectively engage 
with Haidt’s (2012) moral foundations theory do not stop here: Democrats could also use 
Christian language to interface with the other three moral foundations that they usually avoid 
discussing. If we examine Haidt’s (2012) research more closely, while he does assert that liberals 
primarily rely on three moral foundations, he does not state that liberals ignore the other three 
altogether. The aggregate results from the study he conducts to determine which moral 
foundations resonate most with particular individuals indicate that liberals are certainly very 
concerned with Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating, and Liberty/Oppression, but they also care about 
Authority/Subversion, Sanctity/Degradation, and Loyalty/Betrayal (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 
2009: 1033). Given that most liberals do care about the other three foundations and 
comparatively few liberals thought that they were completely irrelevant to moral judgment, 
Democrats could feasibly broaden the moral appeal of their political messaging by referring to 
the other three foundations. In turn, this could potentially result in voters attaching positive affect 




to a greater number of conceptual nodes associated with Democrats’ candidacies. Moreover, 
engaging with the other three foundations might also help Democrats gain some political traction 
amongst more conservative Democratic voters.  
     It is worth noting that liberals with a broader moral palate, to use Haidt’s (2012) analogy, do 
not confound Lakoff’s (2002) model. Clearly, Nurturant Parent Morality posits that liberals are 
very concerned with the Care/Harm foundation. Yet the concept of nurturance applies to other 
foundations as well. For example, Lakoff (2002) describes how parents in his model have a 
legitimate authority due to their effective nurturance and thus should be listened to and respected 
(134). To put this another way, Nurturant Parent Morality does not perceive all hierarchies as 
bad or immoral; as such, concerns over the Authority/Subversion foundation might arise in the 
model in instances when legitimate authority is not respected.  
    Democrats who wish to interface with broader moral matrices, especially those emphasizing 
the Sanctity and Authority foundations, could do so using Christian language. After all, defining 
and venerating the sacred and respecting divine authority are central to many religious 
enterprises, including Christianity (Smith 2003: 109).8 To examine how this might work, we can 
turn to the “Reforming Our Criminal Justice System” section of the 2016 Democratic Party 
Platform where we see that Democrats’ argument for abolishing the death penalty reads as 
follows: “The application of the death penalty is arbitrary and unjust. The cost to taxpayers far 
exceeds those of life imprisonment. It does not deter crime” (Democratic Platform Committee 
2016). This argument reads like a typical liberal policy proposal in that it a) relies on empirical 
frameworks such as an economic cost/benefit analysis to make its case and b) it contains a weak 
moral appeal that half-heartedly addresses the “withdraw” side of the Fairness/Cheating 
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foundation. Democrats could broaden the moral appeal of their anti-death penalty stance if they 
phrased it like this:  
The death penalty has no place in the criminal justice system. Dangerous and violent 
criminals should certainly face punishment for their decision to abuse the liberties 
inherent in American society, yet we must retain our reverence for life by remaining loyal 
to our moral heritage. We are all made in God’s image, and all life is a divine gift.  
 
This paragraph demonstrates how Democrats could use a religious appeal in their stance against 
capital punishment that aims at the “approach” side of the Sanctity/Degradation foundation by 
emphasizing the intrinsic value of every human life in explicitly religious terms. Voters who are 
responsive to the Sanctity/Degradation might read this appeal and view proponents of the death 
penalty in an unfavorable or even immoral light, as by advocating for capital punishment they 
are challenging Christian teachings.  
The Impact of Christian Language on Political Information Processing   
      For some readers, this sort of language pertaining to a Christian conception of the sacredness 
of life skirts uncomfortably close to the arguments religious conservatives make in opposition to 
abortion. As such, these readers might argue that if Democrats used this type of language, they 
would needlessly expose themselves to charges of hypocrisy. However, I argue that using 
Christian language is worth that risk. Research shows that the positive affect associated with 
mentions of Christianity can bias downstream information processing so as to positively 
influence individuals’ subsequent evaluations of a candidate in a phenomenon called “affect 
contagion" (Albertson 2011, Lodge and Taber 2013). This final section of the theory will 
elaborate on the specific cognitive mechanisms involved in hot cognition and affect contagion in 
order to explain how this process occurs and why it would behoove Democrats to take advantage 
of it via Christian language in their political appeals.  




     In their book The Rationalizing Voter, Lodge and Taber (2013) propose the John Q. Public 
model of political information processing. This model centers upon the importance of hot 
cognition to political reasoning. It argues that political decision-making rarely occurs within the 
conventional model of reasoned evaluation. There are three stages in this conventional 
information processing model that casts voters as intentional rational deliberators. First, an event 
occurs that causes the mind to retrieve affectively and semantically related considerations from 
working memory and long-term memory. Next, the mind uses these considerations to engage in 
conscious deliberation. Finally, reasoned evaluations emerge from these conscious deliberations 
(Lodge and Taber 2013: 19). While scholars and politicians who believe that voters are capable 
of rational, empirical deliberation will gravitate towards this sequence, it fails to account for the 
wide array of unconscious mechanisms that influence our decision-making.  
     Many of these mechanisms fall under the category of hot cognition, which lies at the heart of 
the John Q. Public model. It refers to the fact that “all thinking is suffused with feeling” (ibid).  
Lodge and Taber (2013) propose that information stored in our long-term memory is organized 
in conceptual objects “linked together by a network of associations” (29). Each conceptual object 
carries positive and/or negative affect. As a result, our information processing is affectively 
charged from the very beginning. The conventional processing sequence of consideration 
retrieval, conscious deliberation, and reasoned evaluation only occurs within the affectively 
charged context of hot cognition.  
     Just after the beginning of the information processing sequence, once these positive and/or 
negative feelings have been aroused, “activation will spread along well-traveled associative 
pathways…thereby enriching our semantic understanding of the original stimulus” (20). As our 
mind seeks to understand the stimulus before us, it necessarily draws from concepts stored in our 




long-term memory, as our working memory (what we are thinking about in real-time) can only 
grapple with around seven concepts at a time (17). Cognitive scientists frame this step in 
information processing as a competition between activated concepts. Lodge and Taber (2013) 
argue that concepts that are both semantically and affectively related to the stimulus are most 
likely to win the competition and move into working memory (18). They refer to this process as 
affect contagion (135). If the affect associated with the original stimulus is positive, concepts that 
are semantically related to the stimulus and carry positive affective tags are most likely to enter 
working memory, where they will enter conscious awareness as relative considerations for 
evaluation (ibid).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
     Affect contagion has important implications for political reasoning. Remarkably, Lodge and 
Taber (2013) show that even primes that are semantically unrelated to political issues and go 
unnoticed by conscious thought can “influence subsequent conscious thinking and reasoning” 
(136). They primed undergraduates at Stony Brook University with cartoon smiley faces, frowny 
faces, or neutral faces9 and found that subjects exposed to positive primes (smiley faces) 
demonstrated increased support for an anti-immigration policy as measured by the number of 
positive thoughts they recorded about the policy (146). These results provide support for what 
Lodge and Taber (2013) call the “affective mediation effect” in which “affectively biased 
thoughts enter into the construction of reported evaluations and promote prime-congruent policy 
preferences and attitude change” (137). In this case, the attitude change is implicit, meaning 
“outside of conscious appraisal” (35).  
																																																								
9	The cartoon primes were smiley faces, frowny faces, or neutral faces. They were flashed on a 
computer screen for 39 milliseconds, which is too fast for conscious awareness. Before and after 
the primes were displayed, the subjects were shown	“masks”	meant	to	impair	visual	memory	
of	the	primes.	 




     When we consider affect contagion in the context of emotion-based moral judgments, we can 
posit a mechanism through which the affect associated with moral judgments can influence 
political evaluations. If a Democratic candidate uses Christian language to propose a variety of 
policies rooted in Nurturant Parent Morality or the Moral Foundations theory, when liberal 
voters think of those policies, they will feel a flash of positive affect because the policy proposal 
is congruent with their moral matrices. These flashes of positive affect go on to impact 
downstream information processing via the affective mediation effect. When liberal voters who 
have subconsciously associated a candidate’s policies with positive affect form overall 
evaluations of a candidate, these evaluations are formed on the basis of conceptual objects that 
are also positively affectively tagged. Therefore, these final evaluations are more positive than 
they would have been otherwise (in the absence of the initial positively affectively tagged policy 
proposal rooted in a moral matrix).   
     While Lodge and Taber (2013) use semantically unrelated primes to induce attitude change, 
other researchers have achieved the same effect using Christian political appeals as semantically 
related primes. Studies like these continue to strengthen the case for Democrats to use Christian 
appeals: affect contagion may occur not only due to the positive affect attached to moral 
judgments that are congruent with liberals’ moral matrices but also because of the positive affect 
attached to Christian appeals in and of themselves. In one study, Albertson (2011) tests to see if 
Christian political appeals are congruent with hot cognition and the affective mediation effect. 
She asked her undergraduate subjects to read a segment of a political speech attributed to either 
George W. Bush or Bill Clinton. In the control condition, the speech had no religious appeal, 
while in the treatment condition, the speech had a short biblical reference. After they read the 
speech, subjects took a paper Implicit Attitude Test (IAT) and answered follow-up questions that 




included an explicit attitude measure (a feeling thermometer) and a political behavior question 
asking the students to report the likelihood that they would attend a speech given by either Bush 
or Clinton in a nearby town (Albertson 2011).  
     Albertson (2011) found that exposure to religious appeals significantly improved implicit 
attitudes towards both Bush and Clinton. Additionally, she found significant increases in the 
treatment group’s reported likelihood of attending a nearby political speech given by Bush or 
Clinton. Granted, these results were only true for subjects who either identified as Christian or 
were raised Christian. This intuitively makes sense: “persuasion at the implicit level relies on a 
match between the nature of the appeal and the background of the individual” (Albertson 2011: 
122). However, more intriguing is the fact that these results held amongst those individuals with 
previous exposure to Christianity even if they indicated on the post-IAT survey that they 
believed that there was too much religious discourse in politics. Given that a majority of her 
subjects expressed a preference for less religious discourse in politics, which could very well be 
the product of adherence to a political philosophy that espouses the separation of church and 
state, these findings speak to the powerful effect of religious appeals on information processing. 
     To recap, Albertson (2011) found that exposure to a Christian appeal improved attitudes 
towards the political figure issuing the appeal and positively influenced political behavior 
associated with supporting that person. To frame Albertson’s (2011) results in terms of the John 
Q. Public model, it is possible that Christian appeals carry positive affective tags regardless of 
whether the individual in question is a practicing Christian or even endorses the presence of 
religious language in politics. As we saw earlier, a positive affective tag colors downstream 
processing by biasing the sampling process from long-term memory in favor of affectively 
congruent objects, which become the basis for subsequent evaluations. And while subjects’ 




explicit attitudes (formed by conscious deliberation) towards the candidates may have remained 
the same in the control and the treatment conditions, their implicit attitudes and their projections 
of their future political behavior told another story, a story that bolsters the case for integrating 
Christian language into political messaging.   
Discussion 
     This section has taken a top-down approach to making the case for how Democrats could 
invoke Christianity as the basis for moral narratives in their political messaging. First, I 
discussed how narratives shape our understanding of ourselves as moral agents. Democrats who 
tend to avoid storytelling will consequently struggle to disseminate a moral message. When 
voters are exposed to moral messages, they make moral judgments that are affected by 
lightening-quick, subconscious emotional responses to the moral scenario in question. Many 
political decisions have moral underpinnings, so when voters make political choices, they are 
often catalyzed by emotion rather than an empirical cost-benefit analysis of policy.  
     Given that many Democratic politicians are Christians and that many Democratic voters are 
Christian as well, Democrats could conceivably use Christian language to help them craft moral 
narratives that resonate with liberal voters’ moral matrices. First, I showed that language 
centering around the central Christian teaching of “love thy neighbor” would interface well with 
Lakoff’s (2002) Nurturant Parent Model of liberal morality, as well as the “approach” sides of 
the liberal moral foundations proposed by Haidt (2012). Second, I argued that Christian language 
would assist Democrats in interfacing with more expansive moral matrices like those 
emphasizing a combination of the other three moral foundations. Specifically, I demonstrated 
how Christianity might be useful in interfacing with the Sanctity/Degradation foundation.  




     Finally, I turned to the John Q. Public model of political information processing to propose 
that any mention of Christianity has the potential to positively influence political attitudes at the 
subconscious level. The implications of this model for my theory are profound: because the 
attitude change occurs below the threshold of conscious awareness, liberal voters with exposure 
to Christianity might view a Democrat who uses a Christian appeal more positively even if some 
of these voters report they would rather religion stay out of politics altogether. This occurs via 
the process of affect contagion in which the processing of positively affectively tagged 
conceptual objects leads to the subsequent movement of similarly affectively tagged objects into 
working memory, where they form the basis of overall political evaluations. Arguably, 
Albertson’s (2011) findings regarding implicit attitude change and Lodge and Taber’s (2013) 
model of affect contagion suggest that simply mentioning Christianity can assist Democrats in 
improving liberal voters’ political attitudes towards their candidacies.  
     In short, Christian Democrats, if they so choose, have a path forward when it comes to 
integrating their faith into their political messaging. Extant research in political psychology 
suggests that the use of Christian appeals may very well be a legitimate electoral tactic for 
Democratic politicians trying to earn the support of liberal voters.  
Christian Appeals in the Speeches of Barack Obama, John Kerry, and Hillary Clinton   
     This section conducts three case studies of Democratic politicians’ political rhetoric in order 
to explicate the theory from the second section. In these studies, I will examine several speeches 
for the four core components of my theory: 1) Does the candidate employ a narrative framework 
that explains their own candidacy or some aspect of their vision for America? 2a) Does the 
candidate use Christian language? 2b) What are the possible implications for this use as it relates 
to the John Q. Public model of subconscious information processing? 3) Does the candidate 




frame their candidacy or their policy stances in moral terms? 4) If so, do they talk about morality 
as it relates to Christianity?  
     I will begin by analyzing the oratory of President Barack Obama. I have selected Obama as an 
“easy” case in order to demonstrate the “logic and mechanisms” of my theory as well as its 
plausibility (Lipson 2005: 106). Obama is an “easy” case because he presents the absolute best-
case scenario for my theory for the following reasons. First, he is unusual in that he is a 
Democrat who is comfortable with invoking Christian appeals in his public addresses. Second, 
he believes it is important for liberals to use religious language to frame political issues in moral 
terms. Third, he acknowledges the power of narrative in people’s lives. Finally, he is electorally 
successful, having won campaigns at the state, federal, and national level. Given that Obama’s 
own analysis of liberals’ difficulties with narrative and moral language aligns with my theory, 
his rhetoric provides an excellent starting point to examine how my theory might function in real 
political environments.  
     After conducting the Obama case study, I will analyze the rhetoric of John Kerry, the 
erstwhile senator and secretary of state who ran an unsuccessful presidential campaign in 2004. I 
have selected Kerry in order to analyze some of the possible challenges some Christian 
Democrats may face as they attempt to construct moral narratives grounded in religious 
language. I will compare Kerry’s rhetoric to that of Obama to show how he falls short of the 
best-case scenario: while Kerry does use Christian language to construct a narrative about his 
candidacy, he fails to effectively use this language to frame his policy stances in moral terms. In 
order to add a common dimension to the comparison with Obama, I analyze the speech Kerry 
gave on the 39th anniversary of the Selma to Montgomery March at a Black Pentecostal church 
in Mississippi, which is the same commemorative occasion marked by the second of the two 




Obama speeches I examine. Of the many differences between Obama and Kerry, the most salient 
one, for the purposes of this case study and comparison, is Kerry’s Catholicism versus Obama’s 
Protestantism. I argue that even though Kerry drew upon his Catholic background to construct a 
narrative about his candidacy, this same background may have made it more difficult for him to 
use religious language to discuss moral issues in 2003 and 2004 due to the tension between 
Kerry’s pro-choice position on abortion and the vehemently anti-abortion stance of the Catholic 
Church, as well as Catholic teachings concerning deference to the Church’s biblical 
interpretations. Despite these possible external constraints on Kerry’s ability to use his faith to 
address moral issues, Kerry still manages to use Christian language in a way that positions him 
to benefit from affect contagion.   
     For the last case study, I will analyze a speech that Hillary Clinton delivered during her 2016 
campaign for president of the United States. I will show that despite her reputation as a poor 
political storyteller, when the occasion demanded it, Clinton’s speech in this instance contains all 
four core elements of my theory. This case is an example of the plausibility of my theory in that 
it shows how even those Democrats who typically struggle with narrative can effectively use 
Christian language to frame their policy proposals in moral terms.  
Christian Narrative in the Rhetoric of Barack Obama  
     Even amongst the ranks of American presidents, the depth and breadth of Barack Obama’s 
intellect and his gift for oratory sets him apart from his fellow denizens of the Oval Office. 
Beginning with his 2004 speech at the Democratic National Convention (DNC), it was clear that 
Obama was no ordinary state senator. Yet even though there are many aspects of Obama’s life 
that are undoubtedly extraordinary, such as his whirlwind upbringing overseas and his historic 
election to the Harvard Law Review, Obama shares one important characteristic with millions of 




Americans: his Christianity. Historians like John Fea have gone so far as to call Obama “the 
most explicitly Christian president in American history;” and even before he became president, 
he made a habit of speaking about his Christian faith in his public addresses (as cited in Smith 
2015: 368). After his victory in 2008, Obama continued to speak frequently about his 
Christianity, especially during times of national sorrow like the aftermath of Sandy Hook and the 
Mother Emanuel shooting in Charleston, South Carolina (369). In this case study, I use two of 
Obama’s most famous speeches to demonstrate the general plausibility of my theory as well as 
its logic and mechanisms (Lipson 2005).   
The “Call to Renewal” Speech 
     Throughout his career of public service, Obama’s rhetoric has demonstrated that he 
understands the power of moral narratives. In 2006, then Senator Obama delivered the keynote 
address at the Call to Renewal conference in Washington, D.C., an event sponsored by a 
progressive faith-based organization called Sojourners. At this event, Obama spoke at length 
about the relationship between faith and politics. He began by framing his speech as an attempt 
to alleviate the suspicion between religious and secular America. Democrats, he claimed, are far 
too willing to cede religious discourse to Republicans out of fear of offending secular voters. By 
doing so, they fail to appreciate what drives people towards religion in the first place:  
This religious tendency is not simply the result of successful marketing by skilled preachers 
or the draw of popular mega-churches. In fact, it speaks to a hunger that’s deeper than 
that…Each day, it seems, thousands of Americans are going about their daily rounds… and 
they’re coming to the realization that something is missing. They are deciding that their 
work, their possessions, their diversions, their sheer busyness, is not enough. They want a 
sense of purpose, a narrative arc to their lives (Obama 2006).  
 
     In this passage, Obama explicitly recognizes the centrality of narrative to the human 
condition. Moreover, he asserts that religion provides a narrative arc to the lives of many 




Americans. Echoing Somers and Gibson (1995) and Smith (2003), Obama states that the 
religious narrative arc he conceives of underpins not only people’s sense of purpose but also 
their “values” and their “obligations toward one another” (ibid). Consequently, Obama argues 
that when Democrats avoid discussing religion, it prevents them from “effectively addressing 
issues in moral terms” because “if we scrub language of all religious content, we forfeit the 
imagery and terminology through which millions of Americans understand both their personal 
morality and social justice” (ibid).  
     These passages demonstrate an awareness of the advantages available to Democrats who 
invoke religious appeals that is congruent with my theory. Obama even anticipates Ricci’s 
(2012) analysis about the lack of liberal storytelling when he observes how, “After all, the 
problems of poverty and racism, the uninsured and the unemployed, are not simply technical 
problems in search of the perfect ten point plan. They are rooted in both societal indifference and 
individual callousness — in the imperfections of man” (ibid). Here, Obama, in so many words, 
takes aim at those liberals who adopt a purely dispassionate and empirical approach to problem 
solving. These individuals, he suggests, should elevate their rhetoric beyond a ten-point, 
problem-solution framework10 and instead situate themselves as public servants grounded by a 
moral mission. 
     The question remains, however, whether Obama follows his own advice. Does he use his Call 
to Renewal speech to tell a moral narrative underpinned by Christianity about his calling to 
public service that resonates with the Lakoff (2002) and Haidt (2012) models? I suggest that he 
does. In 2006, Obama was not yet running for president. As such, his Call to Renewal speech did 
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frames in terms of problems and solutions.  




not need to offer a great deal of policy proposals or justify his candidacy for some higher office. 
Nonetheless, early on in the speech, Obama does recount his own faith journey in a way that 
grounds his public service in Christian morality. Furthermore, on the occasions when he does 
address specific policy issues, he does so in a way that resonates with how Lakoff (2002) and 
Haidt (2012) conceive of liberal moral matrices.  
     Around ten minutes into his speech, Obama begins to talk about his own upbringing and his 
conversion to Christianity. He explains that growing up, he was skeptical of organized religion, 
but after working as a community organizer for a group of churches in the South Side of 
Chicago, he decided to enter the church himself. He describes how “kneeling beneath that cross 
on the South Side, I felt that I heard God’s spirit beckoning me. I submitted myself to His will, 
and dedicated myself to discovering His truth” (ibid). This last phrase in particular (“and 
dedicated myself to discovering His truth”) speaks to Obama’s conception of his faith as an 
ongoing journey that interacts with and informs his public service. With this story as a backdrop, 
Obama mentions several policy issues he cares about. First, he turns to gun violence and 
emphasizes the importance of “keeping guns out of our inner cities” (ibid). But rather than 
directing his ire at the NRA or some other conservative foe, Obama focuses on the moral 
ramifications of an individual’s decision to commit gun violence. He says, “when a gang-banger 
shoots indiscriminately into a crowd because he feels somebody disrespected him, we’ve got a 
moral problem. There’s a hole in that young man’s heart — a hole that the government alone 
cannot fix” (ibid).  
     Here, Obama’s focus on the moral deficits of the shooter, as well as his assertion that 
government alone cannot fix those deficits, frames gun violence in a way that resonates with 
liberal morality. Recall one of the foundational metaphors of Nurturant Parent Morality: “People 




Needing Help are Children Needing Nurturance” (Lakoff 2002: 118). In Obama’s opinion, 
someone who shoots into a crowd needs help, and not just any sort of help. Obama’s image of a 
hole in the heart of the shooter speaks to his belief that a violent person needs spiritual help that 
the secular government cannot provide. Instead, Obama may have meant to suggest that if only 
the shooter had been spiritually nurtured by a community of faith, perhaps a Christian 
community like the one Obama himself participated in before his political career, the shooter 
would have ended up on a more peaceful path. Therefore, the moral issue at stake here, 
according to Obama, is Care in Care/Harm, and not just care for the victims of violence, but care 
for the perpetrators. In the context of Obama’s speech, it is clear that this particular conception of 
care stems from his Christian faith and the moral values he believes this faith entails.  
The Selma 50th Anniversary Speech  
     In 2015, Obama spoke at the 50th anniversary of the Bloody Sunday March in Selma, 
Alabama, an event in which civil rights demonstrators crossed the Edmund Pettus Bridge only to 
be beaten violently back by local police. Obama’s rhetoric in this speech once again 
demonstrates the basic plausibility of my theory: Democrats can use moral narratives grounded 
in Christianity to appeal to liberal voters’ moral matrices. In this speech, Obama recounts the 
actions of civil rights activists and change-makers throughout American history and describes 
them as followers of a divinely inspired path laid out by scripture. He does so in the following 
passage in which he says, “The march on Selma was part of a broader campaign that spanned 
generations; the leaders that day part of a long line of heroes…they did as scripture instructed:  
‘Rejoice in hope, be patient in tribulation, be constant in prayer11’ (Obama 2015). With these 
words, Obama casts the history of American progress with regards to social justice as essentially 
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a Christian endeavor. While he does not claim that progressive change is the exclusive domain of 
Christians (or indeed of religious people as a whole, a point which he emphasizes in his Call to 
Renewal speech), he clearly indicates that progressive social change goes hand in hand with a 
“moral imagination” inherent in Christian principles (ibid).  
     In the middle of his speech, Obama turns to discussing modern-day policy issues, including 
criminal justice reform and economic inequality. If we as a society can exercise the moral 
imagination of the Selma marchers, he says, we can “we can make sure our criminal justice 
system serves all and not just some,” “roll back poverty and the roadblocks to opportunity,” and 
“we can make sure every child gets an education suitable to this new century” (ibid). In light of 
what Obama says before this, these policy proposals become tethered together by the common 
thread of American improvement stemming from a moral, Christian imagination.  
      For Obama, the question of who, exactly, does the improving is easily answered: “Selma 
shows us that America is not the project of any one person. Because the single-most powerful 
word in our democracy is the word ‘We’” (ibid). He goes on to list a number of individuals and 
groups who are noteworthy in their efforts to better America. This conception of improvement as 
a moral imperative driven by a national community is essentially a nurturant one. If we return to 
the four foundational metaphors of the Nurturant Parent Model, we see that the notion of “we” is 
central to liberal morality. For reference, the four-part conceptual metaphor that outlines the 
moral responsibilities of parents and governments is as follows: “(1) The Community is a 
Family. (2) Moral Agents are Nurturing Parents. (3) People Needing Help are Children Needing 
Nurturance. (4). Moral Action is Nurturance” (Lakoff 2002: 154). In this model, moral action is 
a communal activity. A family, or a community, acts together to nurture its children, or people in 
need. Moreover, people in this community “derive” meaning and purpose from these moments of  




“mutual interaction and care” (108). For example, the meaning Obama derives from moral 
nurturance is the meaning of America itself, an America that is a “beacon of opportunity” in 
which “loving this country requires…the willingness to speak out for what is right” (Obama 
2015).  
     Obama ends his speech with an espousal of American exceptionalism rooted in Christianity 
that is worth quoting in full.  
     When it feels the road is too hard, when the torch we’ve been passed feels too heavy, 
we will remember these early travelers, and draw strength from their example, and hold 
firmly the words of the prophet Isaiah:  “Those who hope in the Lord will renew their 
strength.  They will soar on [the] wings like eagles.  They will run and not grow 
weary.  They will walk and not be faint.”   
     We honor those who walked so we could run. We must run so our children soar. 
 And we will not grow weary. For we believe in the power of an awesome God, and we 
believe in this country’s sacred promise. May He bless those warriors of justice no longer 
with us, and bless the United States of America. Thank you, everybody (ibid).  
 
In this conclusion, Obama returns to a Christian moral narrative in order to recap the two 
primary themes of his speech. Both of these themes pertain to Haidt’s (2012) moral foundation 
of Sanctity/Degradation. The first theme deals with the sacred character of activism throughout 
American history. The second theme pertains to the sacred properties of American 
exceptionalism. The first paragraph in the quote above corresponds to the first theme. Here, 
Obama once again characterizes the struggle of American change-makers and activists as 
divinely inspired by linking their tribulations to scriptural axioms. He suggests that perseverance 
and hope in the face of difficulties can be understood as sacred Christian endeavors. The quest 
for freedom and social justice transcends the mundane. In this framework, those who stand in the 
way of freedom are standing in the way of God and degrading scripture itself. In the second 
paragraph, in which he asks God to bless the United States of America, Obama links American 
exceptionalism to the divine when he refers to “the sacred promise” of America (ibid). America 




is exceptional because it is sacred, and it is sacred because it is exceptional, he implies. Either 
way, the American polity and all it entails is something inherently sacred because it is connected 
to God.   
      These rhetorical moves have far-reaching implications. For example, they allow Obama to 
implicitly suggest that anyone who disagrees with his conception of America and the evolution 
of American freedom would actually pit themselves against God as well as Obama himself. 
Questions of policy, in this framework, transcend empiricism and become questions of 
advancing America along a godly path of moral justice. My theory suggests that this sort of 
rhetoric potentially has powerful psychological effects on voters. It provides them with a story 
that deals with morality and consequently asks them to make moral judgments regarding where 
America is now and where it is heading. The affect inherent in these decision-making processes 
may improve political attitudes and galvanize behaviors that benefit Democratic politicians. With 
regards to Albertson’s (2011) findings that the mere mention of Christianity improves political 
attitudes towards Democratic politicians amongst subjects with a Christian background, while it 
is certainly a fool’s errand to attribute Obama’s electoral successes to any one particular factor, 
the fact remains that he was a Democrat who often spoke about his Christianity and never lost an 
election after the year 2000. At the very least, the findings of Albertson (2011) and Taber and 
Lodge (2013) suggests that mentions of Christianity are a) positively affectively tagged and b) 
processed so quickly so as to positively influence political attitudes regardless of the contents of 
liberal voters’ preexisting conscious opinion of a candidate.  
     As a gifted orator who appreciates the power of moral narratives, Obama has no difficulty 
weaving religious appeals into his political rhetoric. By addressing policy within a moral, 
Christian framework, Obama’s messages have the potential to resonate with liberal voters’ moral 




matrices. When liberal voters evaluate his subsequent political actions, his policies and the 
cognitive concept of Obama himself as a public official have already become associated with 
positive affective tags that arose over the course of their moral judgments. Policies with positive 
affective tags that are associated with Obama instantly influence voters’ decision-making 
processes via affect contagion, in which processing a stimulus associated with positive affect 
leads to similarly tagged considerations moving into working memory, where they form the basis 
for an evaluation of a candidate that is more positive than it would have been otherwise, without 
the Christian appeal (Lodge and Taber 2013). Essentially, Obama’s synthesis of moral narrative 
and Christianity allows him to most effectively take advantage of voters’ political processing 
systems as articulated by the John Q. Public model.  
Catholic Constraints on the Religious Rhetoric of John Kerry 
     Not every Democrat is able to use religious appeals as effectively as Obama. When John 
Kerry won the Democratic presidential nomination in 2004, he began to talk publically about his 
Catholic faith more frequently than he had during the primaries (Weiss 2010: 47). This strategy 
may have seemed necessary to Kerry and his advisors given that his Republican opponent, 
President George W. Bush, was a devout Christian who regularly spoke about his faith and the 
influence it had on his politics12 (Smith 2006: 366). One of the earlier examples of Kerry’s new 
strategy is a speech he gave in Jackson, Mississippi, to a black Pentecostal church in March 
2004. In this speech, Kerry effectively uses Christian language to construct a narrative about his 
candidacy. However, he does not use Christianity to frame his policy proposals in moral terms. I 
																																																								
12 One of Bush’s most famous electoral moments occurred during the 2000 presidential debates 
when he stated that Christ was his favorite philosopher because “he changed my heart” (as cited 
in Smith 2006). Moreover, immediately after Bush was inaugurated, he declared the subsequent 
Sunday a national day of prayer, as he believed he needed the prayers of the public in order to 
succeed in the presidency (ibid). 




posit that this absence of a moral framework can be attributed to Kerry’s desire to avoid public 
conflicts over moral issues with the hierarchy of the Catholic Church.  
     Kerry grew up Catholic in Boston, Massachusetts. Despite his last name and his hometown, 
Kerry does not have Irish roots. His grandparents were actually European Jews who converted to 
Catholicism upon immigrating to the United States (Kranish 2003). According to Kerry’s recent 
biography, Every Day is Extra, his faith faltered after he returned home from Vietnam, but after 
a time of serious reflection, he eventually reconciled with his Catholicism as a senator (as cited 
in Sullivan 2018). This reconciliation did not lead to Kerry changing his position on abortion, a 
practice opposed by the Catholic Church. On the contrary, Kerry remained one of the most pro-
choice politicians in the Senate (FitzGerald 2017).  
     As Weiss (2010) notes, the speech Kerry gave in March 2004 to the Greater Bethlehem 
Temple Church in Jackson, Mississippi marked a substantial departure from the ways in which 
Kerry had previously spoken about Christianity on the campaign trail. In the past, Kerry had 
mostly mentioned religion in the context of distinguishing himself from Bush and the 
Republicans, both of whom, he claimed, “threw” faith at people “overtly” and “reached too far” 
with their partnerships with Christian organizations (Interfaith Alliance 2003). In Jackson, 
however, Kerry wholeheartedly embraced religious rhetoric. It is worth acknowledging that the 
Greater Bethlehem Temple Church is a black Pentecostal church; as such, Kerry likely attempted 
to put his best foot forward, so to speak, in terms of his ability to talk about Christianity (Weiss 
2010: 47). This factor influenced my selection of this particular address for the case study 
because it provided Kerry with a clear opportunity to invoke Christian rhetoric without fear of 
alienating people of other faiths or of no faith at all. Yet even in a scenario where it was 
appropriate to deliver a no holds barred religious address, Kerry did not use his Christianity to 




appeal to his liberal audience’s13 moral matrices. Instead, he uses scripture to craft a narrative in 
which faith motivates himself and his supporters. In essence, my analysis of this case will show 
that while Kerry’s rhetoric incorporates the narrative components of my theory but leaves out 
other central components, specifically moral framings of policy issues, he still stands to benefit 
from the positive affective tags associated with mentions of Christianity (Albertson 2011).  
     Kerry, like Obama several years later, addressed his audience on the anniversary of the Selma 
to Montgomery Civil Rights March. In accordance with the occasion, Kerry begins by 
recounting how “a courageous flock of God's children set out on Highway 80 to live the words 
that still call out to the faithful today: 'When you pray, move your feet’” (Kerry 2004). But Kerry 
quickly switches to a more secular theme. After describing the violence John Lewis and his 
fellow marchers endured on the bridge, Kerry continues, “We need to remember that it was hope 
that conquered the despair of the marchers as they looked towards the entrance of Selma” (ibid). 
He spends a few lines summarizing all the despair he has encountered on the campaign trail 
before returning to the theme of hope: “But in every corner of this country…there was one sound 
in America that rings out louder than…despair. It was the sound of hope. Hope that we can bring 
change to America” (ibid).  
     When we compare these lines to Obama’s Selma anniversary speech, we can ascertain some 
crucial differences between the two narratives the two men construct. First, Kerry does not fully 
commit to using Christianity as the primary theme of his speech. Although he attributes the 
motives of the Selma marchers to Christianity, he attributes their success to hope, a sentiment 
that is much more general and secular than faith in God. By contrast, Obama attributes the 
marchers’ success to their adherence to scripture, specifically a passage from Romans that 
																																																								
13	Black Protestants are a historically Democratic religious constituency who overwhelmingly 
voted for Kerry on Election Day (Green et al. 2007: 24).		




mentions both hope and prayer: “Rejoice in hope, be patient in tribulation, be constant in prayer” 
(Obama 2015). Furthermore, Obama takes an expansive view of faith’s meaning and connection 
to America as a whole when he characterizes the marchers as “ordinary Americans” with “faith 
in God – but also faith in America” (Obama 2015). Kerry, however, identifies the more secular 
qualities of hope and courage as those shared by ordinary Americans that will catalyze change. 
He muses that hope is “the one sound in America that rings out louder than the pain” and urges 
his audience “to find just a tiny bit of the courage of those marchers” in order to move forward 
(Kerry 2004).   
     When Kerry does return to the religious themes of his speech, he declines to articulate the 
implications of Christian teachings for public policy. Instead, Kerry once again portrays 
Christianity as simply as a motivation for vaguely defined political action, presumably in support 
of his campaign. He says,  
We'll be tested to see how much we really remember the words of the scripture, 'What good 
is it, my brothers, if a man claims to have faith but has no deeds?14' We need to remember 
those words so we march forward against a sorry politics where too often words suffice 
where deeds are demanded (ibid).  
In this passage, Kerry undoubtedly succeeds in portraying his candidacy and the work of his 
supporters as driven by Christianity. He uses the theme of marching with faith to tell a story 
about his candidacy that situates it within a Christian framework. However, Kerry does not 
effectively use these references to Christianity to layer moral elements into his speech. While he 
does list several of his policy goals, such as alleviating economic inequality and reducing health 
care costs, he prefaces them with an opaque faith-based exhortation, “We're marching with faith 
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- and determination that together we've come too far not to mean what we say and say what we 
mean” (ibid). What this line means is anyone’s guess, but it certainly represents a missed 
opportunity to speak clearly about the moral implications of faith and how that influences 
Kerry’s public policy; while Kerry’s speech does include a narrative that explains his candidacy 
and vision for America using Christian language, this narrative does not use a Christian moral 
framework to justify his policy proposals.  
     One difference in particular between Kerry and Obama may have contributed to the absence 
of moral language in Kerry’s address. As discussed above, Kerry, unlike Obama, is Catholic. As 
such, Kerry may have felt constrained in his ability to speak about morality from a faith-based 
perspective due to his unwillingness to invite hostility from members of the Catholic hierarchy. 
Throughout the election, Kerry frequently fended off a barrage of criticism from a variety of 
powerful Catholic clergy due to his staunch pro-choice policy positions. For example, then 
Archbishop Raymond Burke of St. Louis announced that Kerry would be barred from taking 
communion at any church in his diocese (Sullivan 2018). Another clergyman, Archbishop 
Charles Chaput, of Denver, Colorado, went even further in his criticism when he suggested in a 
New York Times interview that anyone who voted for Kerry would be “participating in evil” and 
should thus go to confession before they receive communion (Kirkpatrick and Goodstein 2004). 
In many instances, Kerry responded to these critiques by emphasizing the separation between 
church and state or by highlighting his “obligation” to represent all Americans, regardless of 
faith, and adhere to the Constitution (Weiss 2010: 46, Goodstein 2004). It is possible that Kerry 
avoided speaking about moral issues from a Catholic perspective because his public position on 
abortion that defied the Catholic Church at best earned him negative press and at worst 
delegitimized him as a religious spokesperson on moral issues in the eyes of Catholic voters.  




     The ripostes Kerry exchanged with the Catholic Church in the campaign speak to why 
Democrats of particular Christian denominations may determine that the risks of using their faith 
as a foundation for moral narratives outweighs the potential rewards. To examine this through 
the lens of Lodge and Taber’s (2013) John Q. Public model, it is possible that the bad press 
Kerry received for his abortion position resulted in the association of his candidacy with negative 
affective tags such that when voters thought of Kerry, their evaluation of him was immediately 
preceded by a flash of negative affect. While this scenario is purely hypothetical, it is worth 
noting the possibility of a similar occurrence with regards to the Authority/Subversion moral 
foundation. For American Catholics who feel a great deal of respect and deference to the 
Catholic hierarchy, Kerry’s public spats with various archbishops may have activated the 
“withdraw” side, Subversion, of the model. As a result, voters may have viewed Kerry as 
immoral due to the threat he posed against a cherished institution and subconsciously assigned 
him a correspondingly negative affective tag.  
     An additional factor that may have allowed Obama to more freely tie his faith to moral issues 
than Kerry is the highly structured relationship between Catholic clergy and laypeople. 
According to the 2016 edition of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, “to the Church belongs 
the right always and everywhere to announce moral principles” (Ratzinger 2016: 492). 
Furthermore, the faithful “have the duty of observing the constitutions and decrees conveyed by 
the legitimate authority of the Church” (ibid). The obedience required of Catholic laypeople has 
long been a crucial difference between the Catholic and Protestant confessions. This difference is 
especially salient in the United States, where early evangelicals in the 18th and 19th centuries held 
anti-clerical and anti-traditionalist attitudes that stemmed in part from their struggle against 
Catholicism (Fitzgerald 2016: 29, Noll 2002: 379). These particular characteristics of 




Protestantism in the United States potentially make it easier for Protestant politicians like Obama 
to offer their own interpretation of scripture as part of a moral argument for a policy proposal. 
Noll (2002) emphasizes how the democratic nature of early American Christianity manifested 
itself in an adherence to literal interpretation of scripture. According to Noll (2002), “stripping 
away the dross of the past enabled present-day readers to grasp what scripture really meant. 
What scripture really meant was exactly what it said” (Noll 2002: 381). This stands in stark 
contrast to Catholic dogma regarding scriptural interpretation that asserts that the tradition of the 
Catholic Church must be taken into account in any biblical exegesis (Dei Verbum).  
     This is all to say that non-Catholic Christian Democrats are unlikely to face such a 
debilitating level of ecumenical pushback against any particular scriptural interpretation they 
choose to offer on the campaign trail. As such, they may find it less hazardous to use biblical 
language as the foundation for moral narratives in terms of risking potential public spats with 
religious officials on the opposite side of a particular policy issue. However, even though Kerry 
may have avoided linking his faith to specific moral issues, he had no difficulty fitting Christian 
language into a narrative explaining his candidacy. Given that the mere mention of a candidate’s 
Christianity may positively influence liberal voters’ political attitudes via affect contagion,15 this 
case shows that even Christian Democrats who do not use religious rhetoric in complete 
congruence with my theory due to external constraints may nonetheless accrue electoral benefits 
from talking about their faith on the campaign trail (Albertson 2011).  
An Absence of Narrative in the Rhetoric of Hillary Clinton  
     Former First Lady, senator, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has been widely criticized 
for her lack of a coherent narrative throughout her 2016 presidential campaign. For example, 
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Mike McCurry, the former press secretary for the Clinton White House, recently disparaged 
Clinton’s messaging in 2016 when he asked an audience, “What was Clinton’s brand?...Love 
trumps hate? Stronger together? Fighting for us? I’m with her? It never got to a point where she 
could frame an argument about the future” (Johnston 2017). Ricci (2016) offers a similar critique 
in the postscript of Politics Without Stories when he states, “Hillary Clinton projected no 
narrative about America’s current situation. She did not tell a tale about where the country was, 
how it got there, and how, if necessary, life in America could be improved” (Ricci 2016: 209). 
And with regards to religion, Clinton mentioned her faith only in passing in her many of her 
most important public addresses, such as her speech as the presumptive Democratic nominee and 
her acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention in July (Smith 2015).  
     I do not necessarily disagree with these public figures and scholars. However, the purpose of 
this case study is not to add to the chorus of Clinton’s rhetorical critics. On the contrary, I want 
to examine Clinton’s rhetoric in the most favorable context possible in order to ascertain how 
Clinton uses Christian language and moral frameworks in a political situation that arguably calls 
for a different kind of message than an everyday stump speech. As such, I have selected for 
analysis the speech that Clinton gave in July 2016 to the African Methodist Episcopal Church's 
general conference in Philadelphia. Just like in the Kerry case study, because the black church is 
a bastion of Democratic support, this conference provided Clinton with a liberal and religious 
audience and setting that demanded engagement with Christian language. Moreover, Clinton is a 
Methodist herself, meaning that she likely felt more comfortable invoking her faith in front of 
this audience than she may have otherwise. I argue that while Clinton does successfully use 
Christian language to frame her policy proposals in moral terms, she does not integrate them into 
a coherent narrative explaining who she is, why she is running, or what her vision for America is. 




Ultimately, this case study demonstrates that even Democrats who are not adept at using 
narrative in their speeches can still target voters’ moral frameworks simply by integrating 
Christian language into their public addresses.  
     Before turning to heart of the case study, it is helpful to situate this speech in the context of 
Clinton’s faith background. Clinton is a devout Methodist who has written about how her faith 
has shaped her outlook on public service. In her 2004 memoir Living History, Clinton recounts 
how her “active involvement in the First United Methodist Church of Park Ridge opened my 
eyes and ears to the needs of others and helped instill a sense of social responsibility rooted in 
my faith” (Clinton 2004: 21). She goes on to describe her deep appreciation of John Wesley’s 
teaching, “God’s love is expressed through good works” (22). She concludes, “I took Wesley’s 
admonition to heart” and explains how “prayer became a source of solace and guidance for me 
even as a child” (22).  
     In light of Clinton’s own writing about her faith, it is reasonable to assume she felt relatively 
comfortable invoking Christian language in front of a liberal religious audience. Indeed, this 
comfort is evident in the very first moments of her speech. After thanking the church officials for 
welcoming her to the conference, Clinton immediately cites scripture when she says, “You seek 
to meet what the Book of Micah16 tells us are the Lord’s requirements for each of us: ‘To do 
justice, love kindness, and to walk humbly with your God’” (Clinton 2016). Soon after, Clinton 
references her own Methodist community as she reflects on the importance of the AME Church 
to black communities across the country (Clinton 2016). These two early references to scripture 
and her status as a co-religionist theoretically position Clinton to benefit from voters’ 
subconscious information processing. When voters process Clinton’s mentions of her own 
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Christianity, the work of Albertson (2011) suggests that their subsequent attitudes towards her 
candidacy may improve. Even if some members of the audience might articulate otherwise 
negative sentiments about Clinton, the speed of hot cognition preempts these kinds of conscious 
counterarguments. Moreover, Lodge and Taber’s (2013) proposal of affect contagion suggests 
that affectively related concepts are more likely to move into working memory, where they form 
the basis for subsequent evaluations (Lodge and Taber 2013). This means that, theoretically, 
when liberal voters in Clinton’s audience associate positive affect with her mentions of 
Christianity, when they continue to think about Clinton, they will be more likely to recall other 
positive information about her. In turn, this makes it more likely that their ultimate evaluation of 
her candidacy will be more positive than it would have been otherwise (if she did not use 
Christian rhetoric).  
     After introducing herself as a fellow Methodist, Clinton quickly pivots to the main topic of 
her speech: criminal justice reform and the fraught relationship between police and people of 
color in America.17 Clinton addresses these incidents through the prism of “stronger together,” 
one of the central themes of her campaign. She discusses the lack of trust between people of 
color and police and says, “With so little common ground, it can feel impossible to have the 
conversations we need to have, to begin fixing what’s broken… No one has all the answers. We 
need to find them together. Indeed, that is the only way we can find them” (ibid). She suggests 
that finding answers together is not a mere political platitude. Rather, she emphasizes that 
“listening to each other” is actually required by scripture and quotes the Proverbs 2:2 instruction 
to ‘incline our ears to wisdom and apply our hearts to understanding’” (ibid).  
																																																								
17	The week of her speech, police killed two black men in Baton Rouge and St. Paul, and in 
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     These scriptural elements of Clinton’s speech do not comprise a narrative about her 
candidacy. Instead of proposing a vision of an American’s place in the world or locating 
Americans’ lives within a broader moral order, Clinton instead offers rhetoric that is more akin 
to an argument in favor of a particular problem solving method (Smith 2003, Bruner 1996). 
Clinton describes herself as someone who offers a simple scriptural remedy, listening to each 
other, for repairing the relationship between police and people of color in America. She repeats 
the phrase, “we need to listen” throughout her speech as a way to emphasize the importance of 
listening to the voices of communities of color as they struggle with racial discrimination and 
police violence (ibid). From the prism of the Nurturant Parent Model, this exhortation would 
resonate with liberal moral matrices. In Lakoff’s (2002) first description of the model, he states 
that “if the parents’ authority is to be legitimate,” “open, two-way, mutually respectful 
communication is crucial” (Lakoff 2002: 109). In her speech, Clinton hammers home the 
importance of exactly this type of communication when she states, “White Americans need to do 
a better job of listening when African Americans talk”  (Clinton 2016). Towards the end of her 
speech, Clinton continues to emphasize the importance of “two-way, mutually respectful 
communication” when she states, “We can come together…not separated into factions or sides; 
not shouting over each other” (Lakoff: 2002, Clinton 2016).  
     However, Clinton does not effectively locate her call for dialogue within a broader narrative 
context; instead, she simply states, “fierce debates are part of who we are” (ibid). Furthermore, 
she does not attempt to explain how better dialogue might solve other problems America faces. 
In this sense, her claims are fairly narrow because they only pertain to solving gun violence. 
Rather than use narrative to make a sweeping, faith-based moral claim like Obama, Clinton 
limits her proposal to one particular corner of American politics. In turn, this limits the 




opportunity for her to engage with liberal voters’ moral matrices on other issues. Yet even 
though Clinton does not engage in the same kind of political storytelling that Obama does, the 
fact that she still successfully uses her Christianity to interface with liberal voters’ moral 
matrices demonstrates the power of Christian appeals. Christian Democrats who draw upon their 
faith to frame policy issues in moral terms can do so regardless of their comfort with narrative 
(although as the rhetoric of Obama suggests, using narrative arguably makes Christian appeals 
more effective). If, as liberals, they tend to avoid storytelling in the public sphere, as Ricci 
(2016) claims, they can still reference their Christianity to good effect without narrative in order 
to activate liberal voters’ emotions in the context of moral judgments as well as catalyzing the 
process of affect contagion that results in more favorable political attitudes towards their 
candidacies.  
Conclusion 
     In a recent article in The Atlantic, columnist Peter Beinart (2019) notes that several of the 
2020 Democratic presidential candidates, such as Senator Elizabeth Warren and Beto O’Rourke, 
tend to portray religion as a source of division that stands in the way of a unified progressive 
mission. These same candidates also tend to avoid talking about their faith in their landmark 
public addresses such as their campaign kickoff speeches (Beinart 2019). This paper attempts to 
explain why Christian Democrats such as these18 need not neglect religious appeals. It has 
amassed a variety of evidence that suggests that invoking Christianity on the campaign trail may 
have considerable benefits to Democrats as they seek to earn liberal voters’ support. To be sure, 
not every Democrat has the rhetorical ability of Barack Obama, who is a master of crafting 
Christian moral narratives. While I propose that Obama’s Christian appeals are probably the 
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most effective because they are entirely congruent with my theory, I also analyze how John 
Kerry and Hillary Clinton may have positively impacted liberal voters’ attitudes towards their 
candidacies via their use of Christian appeals without moral frameworks or coherent narratives. I 
argue that from a theoretical standpoint, any mention of Christianity at all may help a Christian 
Democrat electorally. Democrats like Obama who invoke Christianity in accordance to my 
theory may very well find that discussing their faith opens new rhetorical pathways to them that 
will allow them to move and motivate their voters.  
     That, after all, is what politics is all about.  
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i	Matt. 25:31-46.…for I was hungry, and ye did not give me to eat; I was thirsty, and ye gave me 
no drink; I was a stranger, and ye took me not in; naked, and ye clothed me not; sick, and in 
prison, and ye visited me not. Then shall they also answer, saying, Lord, when saw we thee 
hungry, or athirst, or a stranger, or naked, or sick, or in prison, and did not minister unto thee? 
Then shall he answer them, saying, Verily I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye did it not unto one of 
these least, ye did it not unto me. And these shall go away into eternal punishment: but the 
righteous into eternal life.	
